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I. INTRODUCTION
A firm that buys assets from another firm ordinarily does not
acquire liability to the seller's creditors simply by buying its assets.' This
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. The author thanks David
G. Owen, James J. White, Robin F. Wilson, and John E. Lopatka for their insight and comments.
1. See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 at 218 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999); cf Fogg v. Blair, 133 U.S. 534,
538 (1890) (noting that the principle that a subsequent purchaser of property at foreclosure will not
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ordinary rule is subject to important exceptions. The buyer's consent
triggers an exception. If a buyer agrees to assume the seller's liability to
third parties, it is for that reason liable.2 This Article considers a more
controversial exception-successor liability. When a court decides that
an asset acquirer should be treated as a "successor" to the transferor, it is
liable for the transferor's debts as though it were the transferor.
The circumstances under which a court will impose successor
liability on an asset acquirer without its consent typically appear as a list
of three. A transferee succeeds to its transferor's debts only when the
transaction between them: (1) "amounts to a consolidation or merger"
(the defacto merger basis); (2) the transferee is "merely a continuation"
of the transferor (the mere continuation basis); or (3) the transfer is
"entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts" (the
fraudulent transfer basis).'
On the surface, imposition of successor liability seems to be an
application of a court's equitable power to elevate substance over form .
A court will treat an asset transferee that is, in a technical legal sense,
distinct from the transferor as though it is not distinct for purposes of
liability whenever it is not in substance independent from the transferor.'
For example, under the fraudulent transfer basis, if the transferee is in
cahoots with the transferor and the transfer is a sham so that the transfer
is a fraud on creditors, the transferee's separate legal existence should be
disregarded. By disregarding its status as a distinct entity, the transferee
acquire any liability for judicial liens that postdate the mortgage is "so familiar that it is surprising
that any other can be supposed to exist"). The rule of non-liability is said to promote alienability of
property, which in turn encourages its productive use. See, e.g., Gallenberg Equip., Inc. v. Agromac
Int'l, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (E.D. Wis. 1998), aff'd, 191 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1999).
2. See, e.g., In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 724 F. Supp.
744, 753 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding transferee liable for transferor's debt to attorney by agreement).
3. 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 7122; 19 AM. JUR. 2D, Corporations § 2705 (1986);
see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973); Sherlock v. Quality
Control Equip. Co., 79 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 1996); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437,
439 (7th Cir. 1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 19:6, 388-89 (3d ed. 2000); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 847; Dorit F. Kressel, Successor Liability in Products Liability
Litigation: Modern Judicial Response to Traditional Corporate Rules, 4 PRODUCTS LIABILITY L.J.
211, 213 (1993); Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to
Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 22 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312 (1939) ("No matter how technically legal
each step in that scheme may have been, once its basic nature was uncovered it was the duty of the
bankruptcy court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction to undo it.").
5. See, e.g., Estey & Assocs. v. McCulloch Corp., 663 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D. Or. 1986).
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is subject to its transferor's creditor's claims as though it were the
transferor.6
The other two bases for successor liability reflect the same
equitable intuition. When the transferee, although technically distinct, is
sufficiently similar to the transferor, the court declares the transferee is
the result of a de facto merger between the transferor and the transferee,
or declares the transferee to be "mere continuation" of the transferor.7
Under the defacto merger basis, a court re-characterizes an asset transfer
as though it were a statutory merger of the transferor with the transferee
because the transferee is, in substance, indistinguishable from the
transferor.' If the parties had complied with the requisites for statutory
merger, the merger statute would have treated the surviving entity as
having acquired the transferor's assets and liability.9 As one court noted,
"[w]hen the form of the transfer does not accurately portray substance,
the courts will not refrain from deciding that the new organization is
simply the older one in another guise."' To the same end, the court can
6. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
7. The de facto merger and "mere continuation" bases do not differ significantly in their
scope from each other. See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor
Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 909 (1983) (noting that the de facto merger and
"mere continuation" bases "tend to overlap, and no criteria can be identified that distinguish them in
any useful manner"). But see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1507-08 & n.7 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that the "mere continuation"
basis restates fraudulent transfer law but that the defacto merger basis potentially embraces certain
nonfraudulent transfers). At least one court has tried to differentiate between the bases. See Nat'l
Gypsum Co. v. Cont'l Brands Corp., 895 F. Supp. 328, 336 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that de facto
merger applies to situations where the ownership, control, and assets of one entity are combined
with a preexisting entity; "mere continuation" applies when the selling corporation sets up a
purchaser with the specific purpose of continuing the same business but with a new form).
8. A transferee is subject to successor liability if "circumstances ... warrant a finding that
there was a de facto consolidation or merger of the [transferor and transferee]." 15 FLETCHER ET
AL., supra note 1, § 7122, at 233; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 12(c) (imposing
successor liability whenever the transferee "constitutes a consolidation or merger with the
predecessor."); 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 7124.20, at 301 ("A de facto merger occurs
when one corporation is absorbed but without compliance with the statutory requirements for a
merger."); Id. § 7041, at 10-11 ("The term 'merger' in connection with corporations ... is
permissibly used to denote various arrangements by which two or more corporations become united
in interest .... [A] merger means the absorption of one corporation by another; the latter retains its
name and corporate identity with the added capital, franchises and powers of the merged
corporation." (citations omitted)).
9. See generally 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, §§ 23.01-.04 (1986).
Commentators have identified the origin of the de facto merger basis for successor liability as an
analogical extension of equitable protection for minority corporate shareholders whose interests
majority shareholders could otherwise squeeze out in an acquisition. See GILSON & BLACK, supra
note 7, at 673-722.
10. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986).
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find the transferee is a "mere continuation" of the transferor and is
therefore liable for the transferor's debts."
Beneath the surface of this equitable approach to successor liability
is the problem of ascertaining when a transferee's legal independence
from the transferor is entitled to respect and when it is not. The
fraudulent transfer basis for successor liability rests on proof of fraud
between the transferor and transferee. 2 The other two bases rest on
evidence of "continuity" between them. 3 Fraudulent transfer law defines
fraud in connection with an asset transfer and thus provides guidance on
the question of when to disregard a transfer for the benefit of creditors.
There is no comparable guidance for courts who must draw a line
between benign and culpable continuity to justify disregard of the
existence of a transferee.
The de facto merger and mere continuation bases for successor
liability have captured the attention of litigants and commentators,
leaving the role of fraudulent transfer law in successor liability doctrine
largely unexplored.' 4 The principal treatise on corporate successor
liability feebly notes that the fraud basis "is merely an application of the
law of fraudulent conveyances."' 5 This cannot be so because imposition
11. See 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 7124.10, at 301 ("The 'mere continuation' of
business exception reinforces the policy of protecting the rights of a creditor by allowing it to
recover from the successor corporation whenever the successor is substantially the same as the
predecessor."). But see Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293-94 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989) (holding that transferor's retention of a minority interest in transferee was insufficient
grounds to invoke "mere continuation" exception absent other indicia of fraud).
12. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
14. In the last thirty years, commentators have paid scant attention to the relationship between
fraudulent transfer law and successor liability doctrine. See Green, supra note 3, at 24 n.33 (noting
that fraud had not played a "significant role" in successor product liability); Phillips, supra note 7,
at 908 (speculating that the fraud is not an important basis for successor liability "because corporate
directors do not favor illegal conduct; furthermore, illegal conduct is bad business and is often
detectable"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 12, reporter's note to cmt. e (noting that the
fraudulent transaction exception "has rarely been used to impose successor liability for products
liability claims"); Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's
Liability for Its Predecessor's Defective Products When the Successor Has Acquired the
Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 819 (1988) ("[The] fraudulent transaction
exception is usually not successfully invoked by products liability plaintiffs.").
15. 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 7125, at 305 ("[I]f the transfer constitutes, either in
fact or as a matter of law, a fraud upon the creditors of the other corporation, the creditors defrauded
by the transfer may, in equity, follow the property into the hands of the new corporation, and subject
it to the satisfaction of their claims, or hold the new corporation liable to the extent of its value."). A
few courts have enunciated what they consider to be a fraud-related yet distinct basis for imposition
of successor liability-for transfers made in bad faith or with inadequate consideration. See Man v.
Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1469 (D. Haw. 1989); Everest v. Am. Transp. Corp., 685 F.
Supp. 203, 206 n.8 (D. Minn. 1988); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984);
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of successor liability on a fraudulent transferee is not the same as
fraudulent transfer avoidance. 6 The difference in remedy between
successor liability and fraudulent transfer avoidance raises an obvious
question. If a transfer is fraudulent, why should a creditor be limited to
transfer avoidance in some circumstances, yet entitled to impose the
broader remedy of successor liability in others? Part IV.A offers an
answer to this question.
A second question arises from the form of the often-cited list of
three bases for imposition of successor liability, of which fraudulent
transfer is but one. 7 If deterring fraudulent transfers explains the
fraudulent transfer basis of successor liability, what theory explains the
so-called de facto merger and mere continuation bases? The listing of
the three bases, like alternate selections on a menu, gives the impression
that the latter two bases justify successor liability upon evidence of
similarities between the transferor and transferee, without evidence that
the asset transfer was a fraud on the transferor's creditors.
This impression is erroneous. All three bases of successor liability
serve the same purpose as fraudulent transfer law-protecting the
transferor's creditors from the effect of a transfer that defrauds them. To
provide a context for understanding the role of fraud in successor
liability doctrine, Part II explains how a debtor and a transferee can
manipulate a transfer of assets to defraud the debtor's creditors. Part III
explains how fraudulent transfer law defines transfer fraud. Part IV
explains that the de facto merger and mere continuation bases focus on
continuity as evidence of fraud, not as an independent justification for
imposition of successor liability. The Article considers in Part V the
most difficult successor liability case-where the transferee could not
possibly have participated in a fraud on creditors because the transferor's
liability to creditors (and the opportunity to defraud them by transfer)
first came to light long after the transfer occurred.
II. How AN ASSET TRANSFER CAN DEFRAUD CREDITORS
This article asserts that the purpose of imposing successor liability
on an asset transferee is to protect creditors from transfers that defraud
them. The threshold task is thus to identify the conduct that constitutes
fraud on creditors. This is a daunting task in some respects because
Orlando Light Bulb Serv., Inc. v. Laser Lighting & Elec. Supply, Inc., 523 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 7122, at 247-48.
16. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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"fraud," like "justice," is not absolutely defined or universally
understood.
Fraud has a relatively stable meaning in the social context relevant
to this discussion-the relationship between a debtor and its creditors.
The simplest way to conceptualize debtor fraud is as deceit. A debtor
defrauds its creditors when he misrepresents his wealth to creditors. He
may lie to make himself look wealthier than he is to induce creditors to
loan him capital in the first place. Or, he may lie to make himself look
insolvent when he is not in order to skip out on his obligations to
creditors and reserve his assets for himself. Suppose that a debtor has
defaulted on his obligation to pay his creditor. When the creditor
attempts to foreclose on the debtor's assets, the debtor lies and says that
he has none, having hidden them in a cave. By this lie, the debtor
effectively steals the assets for himself at his creditor's expense.
Fraud by transfer of assets is identical in effect to deceit by
concealment of assets. The artifice is different because the debtor does
not act alone. Instead of unilaterally concealing assets from his creditors,
the debtor transfers them to a cooperative transferee, who holds them for
their mutual benefit. Unless creditors can reach the assets in the hands of
the transferee or otherwise make the transferee liable to them, the debtor
and transferee can together deceive creditors as effectively as if the
debtor had hidden the assets in a cave.18
The law of fraud protects creditors from loss from the debtor's
misrepresentation or other concealment of his assets. 9 Fraud by transfer
has spawned its own legal response distinct from that of unilateral debtor
fraud because the rights of a third party, the asset transferee, are
implicated. ° From creditors' perspective, the transferee holds the assets
the debtor once had. Left with no effective remedy against the debtor,
creditors want to make the transferee pay their claims. The conflict is not
between the creditor and the debtor but rather between the rights of the
creditor in the transferred assets and those of the transferee.
The possibility of a corporate debtor adds an additional level of
complexity. A corporate debtor is the amalgam of a variety of
18. Garrard Glenn described the effect of transfer fraud on a creditor: "[B]ecause of a change
made by the debtor in the title to assets formerly available, his creditor ... finds no comfort in
ordinary methods of realization." I GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES 75 (rev. ed. 1940).
19. See generally PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 2.01-.02
(1989 & Supp. 2000).
20. See William T. Vukowich, Civil Remedies in Bankruptcy for Corporate Fraud, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 439, 441 (1998).
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relationships among individuals who hold conflicting objectives.2' When
the debtor is a corporation, the debtor/creditor relationship really
encompasses the relationship between creditors on the one hand and
other corporate constituents who hold a different claim against or
interest in the debtor, such as shareholders, on the other. 2 Like a human
debtor who controls assets subject to the claims of his creditors,
corporate insiders-such as shareholders, managers, or other claimants
who can control corporate assets-have an incentive to swipe assets for
themselves at creditors' expense whenever they can get away with it.23
Corporate insiders can perpetrate fraud on corporate creditors like
puppet masters behind the scene. Insiders cause the debtor to move
assets out of creditors' reach to a place where they can capture the value
of those assets for themselves free of creditors' claims.24
The propensity of insiders to divert assets to their benefit and at
creditors' expense is a product of agency. 2 Any agent can use the
21. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (explaining corporate law as a response to the problem of
agency costs).
22. Michael Jensen and William Meckling described the corporate form as a collection of
contractual relationships: "The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of
divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals." Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (emphasis omitted); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835 (1985) ("[T]he
debtor-creditor relationship is essentially contractual."). See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 21.
23. "Armed with private knowledge and able to keep investors in the dark, the managers can
divert income to themselves, stealing and mismanaging at the same time. Diversion and sloth may
not be obvious, but they exist. Even when they do not, the potential for misconduct remains."
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 1.
24. See Andrew J. Nussbaum, Insider Preferences and the Problem of Self-Dealing Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 604-05 (1990).
25. For a discussion on the relationship between corporate stockholders and managers, see
generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls,
Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 487 (1999); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investor's Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 540 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982). For a discussion on the relationship between priority secured creditors and unsecured
creditors, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Credit in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (discussing secured creditors' ability to shift risk of
loss to nonconsensual unsecured creditors and criticizing laws governing priority of creditors'
claims as inefficient). But see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997) (refuting Bebchuk & Fried's efficiency
argument); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
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techniques discussed here to snatch assets for themselves at the expense
of their principals. Collectively, insiders are agents for creditors to the
extent that creditors cede to them control of assets held for their mutual
benefit.26 When insiders manipulate assets in a way that makes them
better off but increases creditors' risk of loss without creditors' assent,
they "externalize" loss to creditors. 7
Financial economists Clifford W. Smith, Jr., and Jerold B. Warner
called the tension between creditors and insiders the "bondholder-
stockholder conflict."28 Once creditors' claims are fixed, by contract or
otherwise, insiders have incentive "to design the firm's operating
characteristics and financial structure in ways which benefit [insiders] to
the detriment of [creditors]."29 For example, shareholders have an
incentive to undertake investments that are riskier than the (typically
fixed) level of risk reflected as interest on creditors' loans. By subjecting
the loaned capital to a greater level of risk than that reflected by interest
rates in the credit agreements, shareholders increase the residual value of
their claims without compensating creditors for bearing increased risk of
loss. 30
When insiders transfer corporate assets outright to a cooperating
third party, they may be engaging in a less subtle technique to the same
end. Of course, from insiders' perspective, a transfer of assets is a
worthwhile opportunistic strategy only if they can both divert assets
from the reach of creditors and keep some (preferably all) of the value of
the assets for themselves. They need a "safe" place to stow the assets
away from creditors yet keep them within their own reach. The safe
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997).
The problem appears in disputes among groups of unsecured creditors as well. For example,
asbestos injury claimants who are sick, try to grab the defendant's assets, leaving claimants who
have been exposed to asbestos but are not sick yet with nothing to satisfy their "future" claims. See,
e.g., Asbestos Defendants, Plaintiffs Look for Legislative, Legal Solutions as Companies Fall, 39
BANKR. CT. DEC., WEEKLY NEWS & COMMENTS, June 25, 2002, at Al.
26. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 22, at 308. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 428 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that the economic term for the problem of
controlling an agent with divergent incentive is the "problem of agency costs").
27. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 49-50; David Morris Phillips,
Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Commercial Law Perspective, I I
HOFSTRA L. REV. 249, 259-60 (1982). If all parties affected by the conduct have not consented to it,
we cannot be sure that the conduct maximizes social wealth. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 15.
28. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118 (1979); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 22, at
308-10 (considering the conflict between managers (i.e., agents) and outside equity and debt holders
(i.e., principals)).
29. Smith & Warner, supra note 28, at 118.
30. See id. at 118-19; POSNER, supra note 26, at 433-34.
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place can be a transferee entity in which insiders hold a controlling
equity interest. Or, it can be an unrelated third party who cooperates with
the insiders in exchange for a piece of the value snatched from creditors.
Corporate creditors know in advance that insiders can manipulate
assets in ways that externalize loss to them, and they do not like it. They
bargain for the right to take the debtor's assets by foreclosure to enforce
the debtor's agreement not to use the assets in ways that exceed fixed
risk levels. 3' For example, a loan may describe as events of default
conditions under which the debtor's enterprise exceeds a certain level of
risk of loss to a creditor.32 A creditor's right to foreclose on specific
assets in the event of default turns the insiders' interest in the debtor
(equity holders' interest in the residual value of the firm) into a hostage
which the creditor can "kill" if the insiders misbehave.33 Foreclosure
liquidates the firm and deprives shareholders of whatever increase in the
expected value of their claim their conduct might have yielded.34 A
creditor's right to foreclose thus controls insiders' incentive to engage in
the loss externalizing behavior in the first place.
But creditors' ability to control insiders' incentive to enrich
themselves at creditors' expense is incomplete. First, contractual
controls are costly and costs vary among creditors.35
Second, no creditor can completely prevent opportunistic conduct
as long as insiders can manipulate the debtor's assets to make the debtor
insolvent.3  Recall that the key to effective creditor control over
opportunistic conduct is recourse to insiders' residual interest in the
31. See Smith & Warner, supra note 28, at 118-19 (describing aspects of the bondholder-
stockholder conflict that the parties can reconcile with bond covenants: manipulation of dividend
policy, claim dilution, asset substitution and under-investment).
32. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 434.
33. See Smith & Warner, supra note 28, at 127-28 (discussing the advantages of using
secured debt and how it can control the shareholders' incentive to take actions that reduce the value
of the firm).
34. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 436 (noting that creditors' claim to the liquidation value of
the firm is entitled to priority over equity claimants).
35. See id. at 435 (noting that contract is useless as a control on shareholder opportunism in
the case of involuntary extensions of credit because such involuntary creditors have no opportunity
to contract with the debtor before incurring their claims); see also Phillips, supra note 27, at 259
(noting that even if a tort claimant had an opportunity to assess risk prior to incurring his claim, tort
claimants typically do not have the experience to do so effectively). Although they cannot
customize their relationship with the debtor, involuntary claimants rely on judicial process to assert
their rights against the debtor's assets. See generally ALCES, supra note 19, 1.01 [2][a] (describing
options for creditors who suspect their debtor is about to hide assets or otherwise increase their risk
of loss).
36. See Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA. L. REV.
1213, 1232-33 (1997).
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debtor. Insiders can deliberately blunt this creditors' weapon by
transferring assets away from the debtor (against whom creditors have a
right of recourse) to themselves or a cohort (against whom creditors
have no right of recourse)." Said another way, insiders can steal the
hostage out from under creditors. And, once the hostage is gone,
creditors' rights against the debtor are ineffective to stop insiders from
enriching themselves at creditors' expense.39
Of course, not all loss-yielding transfers of corporate assets are
"frauds" on creditors. Creditors accept some risk of loss from asset
transfers as a consequence of investment.40 They charge interest for
bearing risk. But, creditors cannot effectively price for the risk that
corporate insiders will line their pockets at creditors' expense.
Conversely, the debtor cannot make a valuable promise to creditors not
to loot the corporate assets. Such a promise is worthless upon the
debtor's insolvency when creditors need it. Once the debtor's assets are
gone, creditor remedies against the debtor like foreclosure are fruitless.
Without some other protection, the problem of controlling the divergent
incentives of insiders will eclipse the potential gains from specialization
between creditor/lenders and insider/managers.
The protection comes in the form of law that affords creditors rights
against transferees. To provide the protection that creditors need and
debtors cannot provide, the law recognizes that in certain cases a
transferee does not acquire assets free of the claims of the transferor's
creditors.4 ' These cases constitute the set of asset transfers that deplete
the wealth of the debtor and impose loss on creditors which they cannot
effectively prevent by foreclosure, or price out through interest charges.
One obvious way to describe this set is all transfers undertaken for the
37. A more complete response to critics of limited liability on efficiency grounds is that
limited liability of shareholders is the wrong scapegoat. The capacity of shareholders to hide wealth
from creditors is to blame for inefficient externalization of loss. This capacity exists because of the
agency of shareholders, and would exist even if shareholders could not limit their liability for the
debts of the corporation to the amount of their investment.
38. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 434 (stating that by hiding assets from creditors,
"shareholders can raise their expected return without compensating the lender for the added risk").
39. See generally Reilly, supra note 36, at 1231-32 (describing the effect of moral hazard on
creditors' ability to control equity holders' conduct as the debtor approaches insolvency).
40. See id. at 1228.
41. See, e.g., Autin v. Piske, 24 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1928) (holding that "[t]he bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction of a suit by the trustee to recover the property of the bankrupt in the hands of
third persons, transferred ... with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors, in violation of
... the Bankruptcy Act").
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purpose of enriching insiders at creditors' expense. A more refined
description of this set is the province of fraudulent transfer law.42
III. How FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW DEFINES TRANSFER FRAUD
A. Actual Fraud
A creditor can avoid a transfer43 and recover the value of the
transferred property from a transferee by proving that the transfer was
actually or constructively fraudulent.44 The first ground, actual fraud,
focuses on evidence of the debtor's purpose in effecting the transfer. A
creditor must show that the debtor intended that the transfer "hinder,
delay, or defraud" its creditors.4 ' Because creditors usually cannot prove
the transferor's subjective intention to defraud its creditors directly,46
courts have discerned the transferor's state of mind by inference from
the facts of the transfer, the so-called "badges of fraud., 47 These badges,
42. Fraudulent transfer law appears in common law or statutory adaptations of the English
Statute of Elizabeth. 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571), reprinted in GLENN, supra note 18, at 1069-70. Most
states have adopted one of two uniform fraudulent transfer acts: the UNIF. FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT ("UFCA"), 7A pt. 11 U.L.A. 2 (1999), or the more recently promulgated UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT ("UFTA"), 7A pt. II U.L.A. 266 (1984). The Bankruptcy Code
contains a federal fraudulent transfer provision, II U.S.C. § 548 (2000), and a provision that
preserves for the bankruptcy trustee the rights of creditors to avoid fraudulent transfers under non-
bankruptcy law, II U.S.C. § 544(b). On the sources of fraudulent transfer law, see generally ALCES,
supra note 19, 5.01 [2].
43. Upon avoidance, the transferee must relinquish the transferred assets or their value to the
challenging creditor. See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 331
(1997).
44. See UFCA §§ 7 (actual fraud), 4-6 (constructive fraud); UF[A §§ 4(a)(l) (actual fraud),
2 (constructive fraud); II U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(l)(A) (actual fraud), 548(a)(l)(B) (constructive fraud).
See generally BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 536 (1994); ALCES, supra note 19,
5.02.
45. The Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571), described avoidable fraudulent transfers as
those which the debtor/transferor intended to "delay, hinder or defraud" creditors. This phrase
appears in modem codifications of "actual fraud." See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(A); UFCA § 7; UFTA
§ 4(a)(1).
46. See, e.g., Wright v. Hart, 75 N.E. 404, 410 (N.Y. 1905) (Vann, J., dissenting) (stating that
the evidence necessary to establish the "furtive scheme must, as a rule, be drawn from hostile
witnesses, usually relatives or intimate friends of the seller, who took part in the fraud and shared in
the plunder"). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party alleging the fraud of another
must plead "the circumstances constituting fraud ... with particularity." FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
Courts require more than a general averment that the defendant "knew" of a false representation.
See, e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[P]laintiffs are still
required to plead the factual basis which gives rise to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent.").
47. See, e.g., Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 812-14 (Star Chamber 1601) (announcing six
badges of fraud); UFTA § 4(b) (listing eleven badges of fraud to be considered in determining
actual fraud under section 4 (a)( 1 )).
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in various combinations, support an inference that the debtor and the
transferee joined forces to use a transfer to enrich themselves at
48
creditors' expense.
"Actual fraud" focuses on the debtor/transferor's subjective
intention to defraud its creditors. 49 But, it is not insensitive to the role of
the transferee. Because the effect of fraudulent transfer avoidance is on
the transferee, it does not make sense to avoid a transfer and deprive the
transferee of its benefit simply because the transferor subjectively and
privately hoped that the transfer would harm his creditors.0 Indeed, the
Statute of Elizabeth expressly protects from avoidance a transferee who
purchases assets "upon good consideration and bona fide .... not having
at the time any manner of notice or knowledge."5' The transferee's
vulnerability to avoidance on actual fraud grounds is based on an
assessment of the badges of fraud. The badges, in turn, support an
inference that the transferee was a participant in a collusive relationship
with the transferor. 2
Actual fraud as grounds for avoidance is most useful when the
transfer occurred under circumstances that preclude any inference other
than that the debtor and transferee colluded to enrich themselves at
creditors' expense." When there is no explanation for the transfer other
than to use it as a tool to strip creditors of assets and line the pockets of
the debtor and the transferee, the debtor surely intended that effect.
Because no other explanation for the transfer is plausible, it is easy to
infer that the transferee knowingly participated in the debtor's plan.
48. The badges can be divided into four groups: (I) the presence of an agency, familial or
other collusive relationship between the transferor and transferee; (2) concealment of the transfer
from creditors or other deceit; (3) the gratuitous nature of the transfer, or the inequivalence of value
given by the transferee for the assets; and (4) the transferor's insolvency or imminent financial
failure at the time of the transfer. See, e.g., UFTA § 4(b).
49. See, e.g., Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable
Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (1995).
50. See Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 535
(1987) (noting that from creditors' perspective the debtor's subjective mental state is irrelevant).
51. 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571). See, e.g., Stratton v. Equitable Bank, 104 B.R. 713, 726 (D. Md.
1989), aff'd, 912 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the creditor cannot avoid transfer on actual
fraud grounds if transferee was without knowledge of fraud and paid fair consideration for the
transfer); In re Mesa, 48 B.R. 208, 210 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (stating that the transferee is
immune from avoidance if it can show it did not intend to participate in a scheme to defraud the
transferor's creditors). But see In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 119 B.R. 416, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that the creditor must show only transferor's fraudulent intention, not transferee's).
52. See, e.g., Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 814 ("[Flor no gift shall be deemed to be bona
fide within the said proviso which is accompanied with any trust ... that the donee shall deal [I
favorably with him in regard of his poor estate ... this shall not be called bonafide within the said
proviso.").
53. See Reilly, supra note 36, at 1245.
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B. Constructive Fraud
Transfers that can be explained only as vehicles for hiding assets
from creditors occur relatively infrequently 4  Most transfers are
ambiguous, in the sense that there is a plausible, benign explanation for
them. Fraudulent transfer law addresses these ambiguous transfers
through a second ground for avoidance known as "constructive fraud."55
Simplifying the law for purposes of this discussion, a transfer is
constructively fraudulent when the transferor transfers an asset to
someone who pays less than it is worth at a time when the transferor
meets certain financial distress criteria. 6 A finding of constructive fraud
thus rests on proof of two facts: (1) disparity in values exchanged on the
transfer which yields a depletion of the wealth of the transferor; and
(2) the insolvent or perilous financial condition of the transferor at the
time of the transfer or thereafter.
Depending on the applicable law, creditors must show that the
transfer was not for "fair consideration"57 in return, or that the transferor
received "less than reasonably equivalent value"" for the assets. Under
either formulation, the court compares the value of the assets transferred
54. For rare examples, see, for example, In re Claxton, 30 B.R. 199, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1983) (holding that the debtor colluded with relatives and friends to keep assets out of his
bankruptcy estate); In re Jones, 68 B.R. 483, 485 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that the debtor
transferred interest in property to a relative shortly before filing his bankruptcy case but retained
possession and use of property).
55. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535 (1994).
56. See UFCA § 4, 7A pt. II U.L.A. 2 (1999) ("Every conveyance made and every obligation
incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors
without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a
fair consideration."). A bankruptcy trustee can avoid a transfer made or incurred on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition if the debtor "received less than reasonably
equivalent value for the transfer," II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994), and the debtor was: insolvent at
the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of it, I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i);
insufficiently capitalized, II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii); or should have known it was incurring debts
beyond its ability to pay, II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii). The UFTA similarly provides constructive
fraud grounds for avoidance but differentiates between the rights of "present" and "future"
creditors. A present creditor is one whose claim "arose before the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred." UFTA § 5(a), 7A pt. 11 U.L.A. 266 (1984).
57. UFCA § 3 states:
Fair consideration is given for property or an obligation, (a) When in exchange for such
property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefore, and in good faith, property is
conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (b) When such property, or obligation is
received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not
disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property, or obligation
obtained.
Id. Note that the definition of "fair consideration" expressly incorporates the transferee's good faith.
58. I1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A); see also UFTA §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a).
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with the value, if any, the transferor receives for them.59 If the transfer is
not for fair or equivalent value in return, the wealth of the debtor is
depleted and creditors are worse off after the transfer than they were
before because the total assets remaining available to satisfy their claims
are less valuable. In contrast, a transfer for equivalent value has no
immediate wealth-depleting effect on the transferor's creditors.
In addition to the wealth-depleting effect, creditors must also prove
that the transferor was insolvent or in perilous financial condition at the
time of the transfer or immediately thereafter. This requirement is
consistent with the idea that creditors should expect to bear some risk of
loss from the debtor's conduct and that fraudulent transfer avoidance
should be limited to those transfers that impose risk of loss that creditors
cannot control by action against the debtor.60 The requirement that the
wealth-depleting transfer occur while the debtor is insolvent, or on the
precipice of financial distress, isolates those transfers that externalize
loss to creditors and that creditors cannot rectify by action against the
debtor.
.Evidence that the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent
value serves a function other than proof that the transfer hurt creditors. It
is a visible symptom of collusion.' That the transferee paid a price for
the assets "unreasonably" less than their true value tends to support an
inference of cooperative price manipulation between the transferor and
the transferee. Put another way, when a transfer of assets occurs for less
than equivalent value in exchange, but evidence of collusion is
inconclusive, it is reasonable to infer that the transferee should have
known that the transfer depleted the wealth of the transferor, and that the
transfer increased risk of loss to its creditors. When a transferee has
notice of this fact, it is reasonable to infer further that the transferee
should have known the transfer externalized that loss to creditors, not
only to the transferee's benefit, but also to the benefit of the transferor's
shareholders or other insiders.62
59. See, e.g., BFP, 511 U.S. at 536; see Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of
Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 Bankr. Dev. J. 55, 79-82 (1991) (discussing judicial interpretation of
"reasonably equivalent value" and concluding that the case law is "hopelessly confused"). For a
discussion of the economic purpose of the requirement of value inequivalence, see Reilly, supra
note 36, at 1235-40.
60. See Zaretsky, supra note 49, at 1176 (stating that a transfer "is unreasonably risky" to
creditors when "there is a high probability that the transaction will inhibit the debtor's ability to pay
its creditors").
61. See Reilly, supra note 36, at 1235.
62. Glenn noted: "[W]hen the argument is that the consideration for a transfer was
insufficient, one is not only bound to consider the fraudulent intent of the debtor, but he must use
the same evidence to test the good faith of the [transferee]." GLENN, supra note 18, at 511. Glenn
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Colloquially, a transferee who gets the deal of the century probably
has an inside connection to the transferor, such as common principals
who can control the terms of the transfer for their mutual benefit and at
the expense of "outsiders" like creditors. Deals that are overwhelmingly
one-sided are usually reserved for "family." And if a transferee is
"family," it is probably in a good position to know precisely what the
transferor's insiders are doing."3
There is a formidable obstacle to the use of value inequivalence to
support an inference of collusion between the transferor and transferee.
It is not always possible to ascertain the "true" value of assets as a
standard of comparison for the value actually exchanged in the transfer.
When a transfer is to the highest bidder among numerous fully informed
bidders, it follows that the transferee paid equivalent value for the assets.
Under such conditions we say that it paid "fair market value" for the
assets.64 If, however, the transfer occurs under other than vigorously
competitive market conditions, it does not follow that the value the
transferee pays for the property is the equivalent of its hypothetical
"true" value.65 Absent benchmark evidence such as the price at which
comparable assets recently sold under analogous market conditions,
there is no evidence of the assets' "true" value apart from the transfer
price itself. 6 Consequently, there is no way to compare the transfer price
with the value of the assets for purposes of assessing value
inequivalence. 6'
explained that in this context, whether the transferee acted "in good faith" turns on "whether the
[transferee] knew, or should have known, that he was not trading normally, but that on the contrary,
the purpose of the trade, so far as the debtor was concerned, was the defrauding of his creditors." Id.
at 512. (emphasis added).
63. See GLENN, supra note 18, at 511 (explaining that inadequacy of consideration will tend
to show the transferee's bad faith as "a buyer knows what he is getting").
64. When the transferor and transferee are participants in a competitive market, we describe
the deal they reach as "at arm's length" or "for fair market value." Other than the increased risk of
loss from an increase in liquidity, such a transfer does not negatively affect creditors.
65. Conditions common among sales of going concern assets that complicate the question of
value include forced sale or other circumstances that limit the number of interested bidders. See
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 763 (1988) (observing that "[i]f an informational
asymmetry prevents third parties from accurately assessing the value of the firm, the secured
creditor may be the high bidder at the foreclosure sale even when the firm is in fact worth more than
its claim").
66. See, e.g., In re Morris Communications NC, Inc., 914 F.2d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 1990)
(noting that in the absence of a sale of comparable assets, post-hoc testimony regarding valuation at
the time of sale "does not provide credible evidence to sustain a finding of fraudulent conveyance").
67. See, e.g., McGill v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 F. 637, 647 (D. Md. 1917) (describing
the problem of hypothetical valuation:
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Recall that one reason we care about value inequivalence is that it
supports an inference of collusion between the transferor and transferee.
When assessment of value inequivalence is an exercise in speculation,
post hoc hypothetical assessments of the "true" value of the assets
without more, do not support an inference that the transferee colluded
with the transferor or otherwise was on notice of a potential fraud on
creditors. The parties could have colluded, but no inference can be
drawn based solely on a comparison between the transfer price, and a
contrived, hypothetical market value.68 The perspective from which
value equivalence is to be judged in cases like this is the subject of
controversy.
The disagreement is over whether a transfer that in retrospect
appears to have depleted the wealth of the debtor should be avoidable by
creditors without evidence of collusion between the transferor and
transferee. 69 The controversy plays out in fraudulent transfer cases
through confusing layers of abstraction. Recall that for a transfer to be
avoidable on constructive fraud grounds, it must have occurred for less
than fair, or reasonably equivalent, value in exchange. 0 The Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA") expressed this concept with the
term "fair consideration," which by definition requires proof of the
transferee's "good faith."'" In a note to the section defining "fair
consideration," the drafters observed that cases considering the fairness
of consideration given for the transferred assets turned on whether the
The effort is to find out not what a real buyer and a real seller, under the conditions
actually surrounding them, do, but what a purely imaginary buyer will pay a make-
believe seller, under circumstances which do not exist .... It is not easy to guess what
will take place in Wonderland, as other people than Lewis Carroll's heroine have found
out.
Id. On valuation problems in the context of successor liability, see Mark J. Roe, Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1559, 1569-77 (1984). On valuation of assets under conditions of uncertainty generally, see
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 81-98.
68. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994).
69. See, e.g., Robert M. Zinman, Noncollusive, Regularly Conducted Foreclosure Sales:
Involuntary, Nonfraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDozo L. REV. 581, 584 (1987) (rejecting the
proposition that the debtor's scheme to defraud its creditors is irrelevant under the constructive
fraud grounds for avoidance). "[Tlhe purpose of the badges, presumptions, and finally the
constructive fraud provisions was to develop methods of ferreting out those transactions that are
inequitable to creditors by the debtor's deliberate design or indifference." Id.
70. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
71. UFCA § 3, 7A pt. 1 UL.A. 2,32(1999).
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value disparity indicated fraudulent intent on the part of the transferor or
collusion on the part of the transferee.72
The subsequently promulgated fraudulent transfer provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code and in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA")
do not use the term "fair consideration" but instead use "reasonably
equivalent value. '7 3 Neither defines "reasonably equivalent value." So,
unlike under the UFCA, evidence of the transferee's "faith," good or
bad, is not expressly required to establish value inequivalence.74 This
new language arguably unlinked value equivalence from its role as
evidence of collusion between the transferor and transferee, leading
some commentators to argue for a new, broader role for fraudulent
transfer avoidance as a means of addressing not only collusive transfers,
but all wealth depleting transfers made while the debtor is, or thereby,
becomes insolvent.75
Commentators who read the Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA as
rendering the transferor's or transferee's "good faith" irrelevant on the
question of reasonably equivalent value, take the position that if after the
transfer, appraisers will testify that the price the transferee paid for the
assets was significantly less than their "fair market value," then the
transfer price was not a "reasonable equivalent" of the assets.76 Under
72. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 352 (1918); see also Note, Good Faith
and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 (1984) ("Despite the Commissioners'
efforts to reduce or eliminate subjective inquiries, [they] are still necessary under the good-faith
requirements of the sections of the Act that concern constructive fraud and remedies.") (citations
omitted). In the Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the UFCA, the drafters note three "confusions
and uncertainties" of the existing law that they intended the UFCA to correct. See UFCA Prefatory
Note, 7A pt. II U.L.A. 2, 2-3 (1999). One of these three confusions was the attempt by courts to
"make the Statute of Elizabeth cover all conveyances which wrong creditors, even though the actual
intent to defraud does not exist." Id.
73. UFTA §§ 4(a)(2), 5, 7A pt. 11 U.L.A. 266, 301, 330 (1984); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i)
(1994).
74. See, e.g., ALCES, supra note 19, 5.0112][c] (noting that after the language change,
"comparisons of the value received by a debtor with the value given up by a debtor are not
complicated with subjective determinations regarding the good faith of the transferee"). Alces is
right if "good faith" is understood as meaning subjective honesty in fact. But, he is not correct in
assuming that the transferee's objectively derived state of mind, what it should have known, is
similarly irrelevant.
75. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 50, at 576 ("The injury to creditors resulting from a
forfeiture of an asset having significant value is equally palpable and ought to be equally remediable
in any rational system without regard to the debtor's mental state, whether or not that condition is
accurately assessed."); ALCES, supra note 19, 5.01 (noting the "increasing 'objectification' of
fraud law").
76. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 552 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Kennedy, supra note 50, at 535 (explaining the use of hypothetically derived fair market value to
evaluate the reasonable equivalence of value exchanged at a foreclosure sale is "wholly consonant
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this view, the test for reasonable equivalence turns exclusively on post
hoc appraisal testimony, without regard to collusion between the parties
to the transfer, or the effect of transferee's legal right to exploit forced
71
sale market conditions on the "true" value of the property.
In a case interpreting the Bankruptcy Code fraudulent transfer
section, the United States Supreme Court held that "reasonably
equivalent value" must be understood to take into account non-
bankruptcy law that authorizes real property foreclosure sales under
other than fair market conditions. In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,75 the
Court held that a real property foreclosure sale price (although
significantly less than a hypothetically derived "fair market value") is
the "reasonably equivalent value" of the property whenever the sale was
non-collusive and properly conducted under state law.79 If, however, the
foreclosure sale was collusive, or otherwise invalid under state law, then
the foreclosure sale price would not enjoy "conclusive force" as the
reasonably equivalent value."8'
In a footnote, the Court limited its holding to mortgage foreclosures
of real estate, cryptically noting that "considerations bearing upon other
foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be
different."8' The Court did not explain why some non-collusive forced
sale conditions must be taken into account in ascertaining the "true"
value of assets, whereas others might not matter.
Since BFP, courts have taken a variety of positions about the kind
of evidence relevant to assess the reasonable equivalence of transfer
with the course of development of creditors' remedies against injurious transfers of their debtors'
assets").
77. The significance of the transferee's state of mind as an indicator of the "fairness" of the
value exchanged for the transferred assets has become muddled in scholarly analysis. For example,
Peter Alces notes that "fair consideration" under UFCA "does not require absolute equivalence... ;
there is room for some inequality, hence, the 'fair' equivalence standard." ALCES, supra note 19,
$ 5.02121[b1i]. He reasons that "Itihe purpose for the flexibility in the definition is to assure that
fraudulent disposition law will not have too great a chilling effect on commercial transactions." Id.
"Fairness," in his view "provides an accommodation of the interests implicated, a balance between
the need to permit transactors to make deals ... and the need to fix a point beyond which courts will
not permit [transferors) to enter into transactions that will too profoundly impair their ability to
discharge obligations to creditors." Id. Alces observes merely that "fairness" means "fairness."
78. 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (interpreting II U.S.C. § 548).
79. See id. at 545. In 1984, Congress considered, but did not adopt, a provision which would
have confined fraudulent transfer avoidance in bankruptcy for foreclosure sales to those involving
collusion or other procedural irregularities. S. 445, 98th Cong., § 360 (1983).
80. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 545-46.
81. Id. at 537 n.3.
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prices at forced sales. 2 For example, some courts have held that a tax
sale conducted according to state law does not per se yield reasonably
equivalent value for purposes of a fraudulent transfer action by a trustee
in the debtor's bankruptcy case . Other courts have held that a non-
collusive tax sale does yield per se reasonably equivalent value if the
state law provided for due process and an opportunity for competitive
bidding akin to the judicial foreclosure sale of real property at issue in
BFP.
84
BFP resolved one aspect of the controversy about "reasonably
equivalent value." "True" value does not equal value hypothetically
derived without regard to the market conditions under which the transfer
actually occurs, at least in circumstances analogous to the forced sale at
issue in that case. The Court did not resolve the larger controversy about
what purpose value comparison is to achieve in constructive fraud
analysis.85 Specifically, BFP neither adopted nor rejected the view that
the reason to assess value inequivalence is as an indirect way of
assessing the likelihood of collusion between the transferor and
16transferee in fraud of creditors. Although BFP does not resolve this
controversy, it does support the view that the assessment of "reasonably
equivalent value" must render benign factors that affect the price
received for the assets on the transfer, but do not support an inference of
collusion, such as mortgage foreclosure procedures that authorize and
regulate forced sales.87
82. Compare Vermillion v. Scarbrough, 176 B.R. 563, 568 (Bankr. D. Or. 1994) (land sale
contract forfeiture sale price yields reasonably equivalent value) and McCanna v. Burke, 197 B.R.
333, 341 (D.N.M. 1996) (same) with In re Grady, 202 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1996) (land
sale contract forfeiture sale price not per se reasonably equivalent value).
83. See, e.g., In re Sherman, 223 B.R. 555, 559 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (tax sale under
Wyoming law to person selected in random lottery for amount of outstanding taxes and without
regard to value of property, however measured); In re Wentworth, 221 B.R. 316, 319-20 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1998) (tax forfeiture sale occurred under Maine law without judicial oversight, public notice
or competitive bidding).
84. See, e.g., In re Russell-Polk, 200 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996); In re Golden,
190 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995); In re Hollar, 184 B.R. 243, 252 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995);
In re Lord, 179 B.R. 429, 434 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
85. The case addressed the meaning of the term "reasonably equivalent value" in II U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994). The same term appears in the same context in the UFFA § 4(a)(2), 7A pt.
11 U.L.A. 266 (1999). Although courts interpreting the UFTA (including bankruptcy courts applying
UFTA via I I U.S.C. § 544(b)) may consider BFP as persuasive, they are not bound by the holding
even in cases involving real property foreclosure sales.
86. See generally BFP, 511 U.S. 531.
87. See id. at 540.
20031
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF FRAUD IN SUCCESSOR LIABILITY CASES
A. Successor Liability for Actual Fraud: The Traditional Requisites for
De Facto Merger and Mere Continuation
We have considered how an asset transferee can be a fraudulent
transferee and subject to transfer avoidance.88 When should a fraudulent
transferee be treated as a successor subject to successor liability? The
question is worth asking because the remedy of transfer avoidance is
different than imposition of successor liability. Transfer avoidance
permits a creditor to proceed against the transferred property or its value,
even though it has passed into the hands of a transferee. "9 Under federal
bankruptcy law on fraudulent transfer avoidance, "the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the
court so orders, the value of such property."' The challenging creditor
enjoys any post-transfer appreciation in the property's value, and the
fraudulent transferee absorbs any depreciation."
In contrast, successor liability is not an asset-specific remedy. It
renders the transferee derivatively liable in personam and subject to all
claims valid against the transferor as though it were the transferor,
without limitation to the value of the specific property transferred. 92
Where inconclusive market data, passage of time or other factors make
proof of the assets' value difficult, or where the creditor's claim exceeds
the current value of the transferred assets, successor liability is clearly
the creditors' remedy of choice.
The question is the domain of successor liability apart from
fraudulent transfer avoidance. The answer becomes clear by examining
the traditional requisites for imposition of successor liability on grounds
88. See generally supra Parts 11 and III.
89. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)-(b); UFTA § 7(a)(1); UFCA §§ 9(l)(a), 10(c), 7A pt. 11 U.L.A. 2
(1999); TABB, supra note 43, at 451-54.
90. II U.S.C. § 550(a) (1994); see also UFTA § 8(b).
91. See TABB. supra note 43, at 453. Tabb describes this outcome as "heads-l-win-tails-you-
lose" from the perspective of the avoiding creditor. See id. If the property appreciates in value
following the transfer, the creditor will choose to recover the property itself. See I I U.S.C. § 550(a).
Both the Bankruptcy Code and UF'A subject this value to equitable adjustments in favor of a
"good faith" transferee to take into account post-transfer improvements in the property made by
such a transferee. See I I U.S.C. § 550(e); UFTA § 8(c). If the property declines in value post-
transfer, the creditor will ask the court to order the transferee to pay the value of the property
transferred fixed as of the date of the transfer. See generally Reilly, supra note 36, at 1240-41
(describing the relatively more favorable treatment afforded a "good faith" fraudulent transferee
whose connection to the fraud is by negligence).
92. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note I, § 7122.
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of de facto merger or "mere continuation." The factors traditionally
required to establish that a transfer of assets constituted a de facto
merger, or the transferee is a "mere continuation" of the transferor are:
(1) a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation so that
there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location,
assets, and general business operations; (2) a continuity of
shareholders which results from the purchasing corporation paying for
the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately
coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that
they become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation; (3) the
seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operation, liquidates and
dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; and (4) the
purchasing corporation assumes those obligations of the seller
ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller corporation.93
This list of four factors for a finding of de facto merger is an
ingredient list for a particular kind of fraudulent transfer. Suppose that a
debtor borrows $100,000 from a creditor and uses the money to purchase
assets for a widget-making business. The debtor's shareholders decide
they would like to exploit the business for themselves without repaying
to the creditor the $100,000 that the debtor borrowed. In other words,
they form classic fraudulent intent. One obvious strategy is to load the
widget-making assets on a truck and drive for the hills. The success of
this strategy depends on whether the shareholders can hide in the hills
and still exploit the widget-making assets. Suppose that successful
hiding requires moth-balling the assets, defeating the purpose of
absconding with them in the first place.
An alternate strategy is to sell the assets to a third party for their
market value ($100,000) then pocket the cash and head for the hills. The
shareholders would extract for themselves the liquidation value of the
assets and leave the debtor unable to satisfy the claims of its creditors.
Leaving aside for the moment the shareholders' vulnerability as
fraudulent transferees upon receipt of a $100,000 dividend from the
debtor corporation, by selling the widget-making assets to a third party,
they forfeit any going concern value intrinsic in use of the assets for
widget-making under their management. Liquidating the business in
93. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1, § 7124.20. The litany of elements in Fletcher has been
influential. It appears regularly in cases that consider successor liability on grounds of de facto
merger. See, e.g., Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1291 (8th Cir. 1983); Arnold Graphics
Indus. v. Indep. Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1985); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1985).
2003]
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
order to steal the cash is relatively unattractive whenever the
shareholders value their interest in the business as a going concern more
highly than the market does.
The shareholders want to have their cake and eat it too. They want
to reap the benefits of a fraud on creditors, without losing their
idiosyncratic interest in the going concern value of the firm. So they
create or acquire a transferee that is a technically distinct entity but
which they control. They arrange for the debtor to transfer its assets to
this transferee. The transferee "pays" for the assets by issuing its equity
directly to the shareholders (paying nothing to the debtor), or to the
debtor who distributes the cash to its shareholders.94 After the transfer,
the shareholders control the transferee and thereby the transferred assets.
The transferee continues the widget-making business operation exactly
as the shareholders had run it before the transfer. If the creditor cannot
assert its claim against the transferee, the shareholders will have worked
a perfect fraud. 9
The factors requisite for a finding of de facto merger or mere
continuation describe this hypothetical transaction-a particular kind of
actual fraud on creditors.96 The shareholders continue their interest in the
widget-making business now technically in the hands of the transferee
and free of creditors' claims. The transfer does not affect the widget-
making business other than to separate creditors from recourse to it.97
Only one conclusion about this type of transfer is possible. It is a vehicle
by which the debtor's shareholders divert assets to themselves through
the artifice of a transferee at the expense of creditors.
Recall that the question is why creditors should be able to impose
successor liability on the transferee in these circumstances rather than
the asset specific remedy of fraudulent transfer avoidance. The answer is
that in this case, there is no difference between the remedies of transfer
94. See, e.g., Pepper v. Dixie Splint Coal Co., 181 S.E. 406, 407 (Va. 1935) (involving a
transferee, organized under the same name as the transferor and owned by the transferor's
shareholders, acquiring the assets of the transferor but paying nothing for them).
95. See, e.g., Estey & Assoc. v. McCulloch Corp., 663 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D. Or. 1986)
(finding that the theory of the "mere continuation" basis is to prevent fraud on creditors when a
corporation goes through a change in form but not substance); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (D. Mass. 1989) (recognizing application of successor liability
doctrine to CERCLA claims prevents polluters and their acquirers from escaping liability "through
formalistic corporate slight of hand").
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
97. Courts have adopted a millinery metaphor to describe this scheme. "[T]he purchasing
corporation maintains the same or similar management and ownership but wears a 'new hat."'
Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Bud Antle,
Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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avoidance and successor liability, assuming that nothing has changed
between the time of the sham transfer and that of the creditor's
challenge. Whenever the transferee acquired all the assets of the
transferor as a going concern, and perfectly replicates the debtor's
operations at all times, the value of the debtor's assets at the time of the
transfer necessarily equals the value of the transferee's assets at the time
of the challenge. 98 If we relax the assumption to assume that the value of
the assets has changed with the passage of time, subjecting all of the
assets of the transferee to the creditors' claims still achieves the same
result as fraudulent transfer avoidance. The creditors enjoy any
appreciation in the value of the assets post-transfer, and the transferee
absorbs any depreciation. 99
Now further relax the assumption of perfect and permanent identity
between the debtor and the transferee. When a fraudulent transferee
deploys the acquired assets after the transfer in a different,
noncontinuous, way with different shareholders, directors and managers,
we see a difference between the remedies of transfer avoidance and
successor liability. Suppose that between the time of the transfer and the
creditor's challenge, the transferee has acquired other assets. Or suppose
that at the time of the transfer, the transferee already had a profitable
business operation which the transferred assets complemented. In either
case, the transferee's value exceeds the value of the transferred assets.
By imposition of successor liability on such a transferee, the creditor
receives the full value of its claim, without limitation to the value of the
transferred assets.' °° In this situation, successor liability exceeds the
property-specific avoidance remedy. What creditors of the transferor
gain, investors in the transferee lose. The amount at issue is the value the
transferee's investors created by their pre- and post-transfer skill.
Successor liability doctrine that transfers this value to the transferor's
creditors creates an inefficient disincentive to value-maximizing
investment. '° '
98. Both fraudulent transfer law and successor liability allocate to the creditor any post-
transfer appreciation in the value of the assets to the extent of his claim. See supra notes 19 and 94
and accompanying text; Roe, supra note 67, at 1575.
99. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. See Roe, supra note 67, at 1576. Roe notes the need to isolate and protect the contribution
of third parties to the value of the transferee is "critical to the goal of asset mobility." Id. See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 12 cmt. b (expressing concern that imposition of successor liability
may unfairly permit a products liability claimant to recover more than they could have had the
transferor/manufacturer remained in business). But see David Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent
Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (1987) (arguing that fraudulent transfer law is
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Imposition of successor liability in a case like this instead of
transfer avoidance may nonetheless be appropriate as a second best
solution. Fraudulent transfer avoidance depends on assessment of the
value of the property as of the time of the transfer relative to the transfer
price. As we have seen, when the transfer occurs other than under
vigorously competitive conditions, the "true" value of the assets, as of
the time of the transfer, may be impossible to discern.' 2 When the assets
transferred are a collection of operating assets sold as a going concern-
the typical successor liability scenario-this condition is especially
likely to exist. Further, the asset-specific remedy of transfer avoidance
depends on the practical ability to value the transferred assets some time
after they have been physically and economically incorporated into a
"different" firm. The passage of time may make impractical a
retrospective assessment of the value of the transferred assets exclusive
of the value of the business into which they have been incorporated.
. Imposition of successor liability may be the only workable measure
of the extent of the transferee's liability.0 3 In these cases, courts should
consider the extent to which imposition of successor liability, rather than
an asset specific avoidance, affects the rights of non-insider investors in
the transferee who could not have participated in the fraud. On this
point, the relevance of continuity of insiders between the transferor and
transferee becomes clear. The greater the identity between the insiders in
the transferor and transferee, the less the reason to be concerned about
the rights of uninvolved third parties. The converse is also true.
B. Successor Liability for Constructive Fraud
The previous section explained how continuity between the
transferor and transferee coupled with problems of valuation justifies
imposition of the remedy of successor liability as opposed to the asset
specific remedy of transfer avoidance. Evidence of continuity has
another function common to both successor liability and fraudulent
not efficient to the extent that the transferee is not subject to liability beyond the current value of the
property transferred).
102. See supra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Wesco Supply Co. v. El Dorado Light & Water Co., 155 S.W. 518, 519 (Ark.
1913) (holding that fraudulent transferee failed to carry its burden of proof as to the value of the
assets transferred and was liable to the creditor to the full extent of the creditor's claim). See Roe,
supra note 67, at 1572 n.32 (explaining that transfer value is a theoretically superior measure of the
transferee's liability, but "a lid [on the transferee's liability] based on the current value is practical
and provides a rough surrogate for transfer value").
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transfer analysis. Evidence of continuity in some circumstances supports
an inference of collusion and fraud.
As discussed above, the list of traditional factors for a finding of de
facto merger or mere continuation describes a transfer and a transferee
that have no purpose but to defraud creditors. '04 Not surprisingly,
fraudulent transfer law, together with this often repeated articulation of
the bases of successor liability, have greatly reduced the potential for
success of such blatantly fraudulent transfers.' °5 Insiders set on fraud
must undertake a more subtle strategy. Courts asked to apply successor
liability doctrine typically face an ambiguous transfer to an entity that is
not a perfect replica of the transferor, and which has a plausible purpose
other than merely to separate creditors from recourse to assets.t0 In cases
like these, litigants have asked courts to interpret the requisites for de
facto merger and mere continuation to expand the scope of successor
liability to include more than the obvious sham transfer.' 7
Whether a transferee should be liable as a successor in cases which
present some, but not all, the factors on the list has become a matter "of
some ferment."'0 8 Some courts interpreting the scope of the de facto
merger basis hold that the key factor is continuity of ownership.' °9 Others
emphasize continuity of shareholders together with the absence or
104. See FLETCHER ET AL, supra note I, § 7124.20.
105. See Roe, supra note 67, at 1568.
106. See id. at 1566.
107. See Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1983).
108. See, e.g., Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974) (preferring
to decide successor liability case by reference to public policy "rather than by a mere procrustean
application of formalities"); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015
(D. Mass. 1989) (stating that the doctrine of defacto merger "rests on general equitable principles").
See generally Phillips, supra note 7, at 906-07 (noting a controversy among courts concerning
"what kind and degree of continuity must exist between a corporation and its successor in order to
hold the successor liable").
109. See, e.g., Gallenberg Equip., Inc. v. Agromac Int'l, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (E.D.
Wis. 1998), affed, 191 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[C.jourts will not generally find a case within
either the mere continuation or de facto merger exceptions unless there is continuity of ownership
between the selling and purchasing corporation."); United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 641
(W.D. Ky. 1990) (noting that majority of jurisdictions require continuity of shareholders); Crawford
Harbor Assocs. v. Blake Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Va. 1987) (IT]he "most critical
element, however, is continuity of ownership"); Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690,
693 (1st Cir. 1984) (same); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc. 758 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (holding same); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 772 F. Supp. 443, 448
(D. Minn. 1990) (same, applying federal common law in CERCLA case); Manh Hung Nguyen v.
Johnson Machine & Press Corp., N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (I11. App. Ct. 1982) ("Continuity of
shareholders is the ultimate justification for allowing liabilities to carry over to the successor."). See
generally Phillips, supra note 7, at 912-13 (noting that courts have been "most persistent" in
requiring stockholder continuity as an essential element of defacto merger).
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inadequacy of value paid for the transferred assets." ° At least one court
has held that plaintiff must show both commonality of shareholders and
corporate leadership.'"
Clearly, courts are uncertain about why continuity of shareholders,
or corporate leadership are important, and what they might be important
to show. One court explained the significance of continuity of
shareholders in vague relational terms. When a transfer of assets is for
cash such that the transferor's shareholders do not acquire an equity
interest in the transferee, the transferor and transferee "were strangers
before the sale and continue to remain strangers after the sale.""' 2 The
choice of language seems to suggest that if the transferee's shareholders
keep in contact with the transferor after a transfer, they may acquire
successor liability in addition to a new friend.
Once fraud is the basis for successor liability, however, the
importance of continuity of shareholders becomes clear. Continuity can
support an inference of the transferee's complicity with insiders of the
transferor. Continuity of shareholders shows that the parties had an
opportunity to rig the transfer to benefit themselves at the expense of the
transferor's creditors. It is not critical that the transferor's shareholders,
as such, continue their interest in the transferee. The fact that any person
who can influence the disposition of the transferor's assets shows up as a
principal on both sides of a transfer supports an inference that the
transfer was rigged.
Suppose a group of the debtor's managers (insiders) decide to
snatch the debtor's assets for their own benefit, stiffing its non-insider
equity claimants and creditors. The insiders locate a transferee and
acquire it. Then they arrange for the debtor (whom they effectively
control) to convey all its assets to the transferee for cash less than the
value of the transferor's assets, an amount of the transferee continues the
business operation formerly conducted by the debtor. The insiders
manipulated both the debtor and the transferee to depress the price of the
110. See, e.g., T.H.S. Northstar Assocs. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 840 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Minn.
1993) (holding that the key factors are continuity of management, personnel, assets and operations,
plus transferee's provision of stock for acquired assets); Crawford Harbor Assocs., 661 F. Supp. at
885 (stating that identity of ownership and management and the absence of consideration are key
factors); G.P. Publications, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc. 481 S.E.2d 674, 680 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that continuity of ownership, adequacy of consideration, and bona fides of
transferee are key factors).
I ll. See Timmerman v. Am. Trencher, Inc., 368 N.W.2d 502 (Neb. 1985).
112. McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 104, (1970), aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1972). But, where the sale of assets is for stock in the transferee, such that the transferor's
shareholders continue their equity interest in the assets, the parties are not strangers post-transfer.
See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801-02 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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transferred assets, thereby diverting wealth to themselves (through the
artifice of the transferee) that should have been available to non-insiders.
Although this transfer is a constructive fraud if it leaves the debtor
insolvent, these facts do not fit squarely with the factors for a finding of
de facto merger or mere continuation. For example, all the debtor's
shareholders do not become shareholders of the transferee."3 Moreover,
the transfer was for cash, and not shares of the transferee. ' 4 Continuity
of insiders between the transferor and transferee together with evidence
of value inequivalence on the transfer support the inference that the
transferee colluded with the transferor's insiders to defraud creditors. As
discussed above, imposition of successor liability on the transferee may
be appropriate as a second best remedy in this case as a surrogate
measure of the value of the transferred assets.'
Now suppose that a transferee acquires the debtor's business for
cash equal to the fair market value of the assets and continues the
business of the transferor. None of the debtor's shareholders acquire an
interest in the transferee, and no insider of the transferor has an interest
in the transferee. These facts do not support an inference of fraud.
Although the transferee continues to use the transferred assets in the
same way, perhaps at the same location with the same managers, there
are no insiders on both sides of the transfer who might have rigged it to
enrich themselves at creditors' expense.
The debtor's insiders do not control the transferee, and the
transferee got no bargain on the transfer. Under these facts, there is no
reason to suspect that the transferor and transferee colluded to enrich
themselves at creditors' expense, and thus no basis to characterize the
transfer of assets to the transferee as fraudulent. Neither fraudulent
transfer avoidance or successor liability are appropriate even though the
transferee continued to use the assets in the same way at the same
location and under the same (non-insider) management.
In A.R. Teeters & Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co.,"'6 the court
correctly identified the relationship between evidence of continuity and
fraud. The presence of one controlling shareholder on both sides of the
transfer, coupled with continuous use of assets, did not support an
inference of collusion or justify successor liability. ' 7 The transfer was
made with the knowledge and direction of the challenging. creditor who
113. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
114. See id.
115. See infra Part IV.A.
116. 836 P.2d 1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
117. See id. at 1040.
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wanted to retain the transferor's patronage as a customer, but did not
want to do business with one of the transferor's two equity holders."8
The remaining acceptable equity holder set up the transferee with
himself as sole shareholder." 9 There was no evidence that the price the
transferee paid the transferor for the assets was inadequate.1
20
The court held that for imposition of successor liability, the
ownership and control of the two corporations must be "substantially
identical."' 2 ' Second, "there [must] be insufficient consideration running
from the new company to the old."' 2  Because the transferee paid fair
value for the assets, the transfer was not fraudulent, and the creditor was
not entitled to relief against the transferee.'23
The court in Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc. 124 misunderstood the
relationship between continuity and fraud. It held that an asset transferee
who continued some of the attributes of the transferor could be liable as
a successor even without evidence of collusion.125 To address their
financial problems, Plastimatic and another company, Danco, agreed to
relinquish their assets to secured creditors for foreclosure.'2 6 Insiders of
Danco and Plastimatic organized a third company, Danco/Plastock, to
bid on the assets at the sale.' 27 Two bidders appeared at the sale, but
Danco/Plastock was the only bidder and its bid exceeded the appraised
value of the assets.'
28
Glynwed was a creditor of Plastimatic under a lease.' 29 It sought
summary judgment against the transferee as a successor to the liability
of Plastimatic, and alternatively, that the transfer of assets by sale was
avoidable.'30  The transferee argued unsuccessfully that Uniform
118. Seeid.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1041.
121. See id. at 1039-40.
122. Id. (citing Maloney v. American Pharm. Co., 207 Cal. App. 3d 282, 287 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989)); see also Enos v. Picacho Gold Mining Co., 133 P.2d 663, 671 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943)
(stating that "the lack of consideration running from the new company to the old is "an essential
foundation" of the mere continuation basis). But see Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
123. See Eastman Kodak, 836 P.2d at 1040-41.
124. 869 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1994).
125. Seeid. at278.
126. See id. at 268.
127. See id. The sale was conducted by a third party, Thomas Industries, who appraised the
assets at $1,850,000 and widely advertised the sale by direct mail and in industry trade journals.
Danco and Plastimatic also notified their creditors, including Glynwed, of the sale.
128. See id.
129. Plastimatic was an assignee of Glynwed's rights as lessee under a lease. Plastimatic had
defaulted under the lease, exposing Glynwed to liability to the lessor. See id. at 266-67.
130. See id. at 269.
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Commercial Code ("UCC") § 9-504 precluded a finding of successor
liability against it, 3' and that successor liability doctrine was not
available to a contractual creditor but only holders of tort and
environmental claims.1
2
Glynwed argued that the transferee was a mere continuation of its
debtor, or the result of a de facto merger.3 3 The creditor could establish
continuity of management, personnel, physical location and general
business operations between the debtor and Danco/Plastock.'3 4 The
creditor also met the second criteria for a finding of de facto merger-
post-transfer dissolution of the debtor-although Plastimatic's
dissolution appeared to be triggered by a consolidation with Danco, over
a year before the foreclosure sale. 35 The court found that individual
shareholders, who collectively owned a significant minority of
Plastimatic and Danco, also held the equity of the transferee,
Danco/Plastock. 136
The court imposed successor liability on the transferee because it
found mutual intent "to effectuate a merger or consolidation rather than
a sale of assets."'37 The continuous interest of insiders and of the going
concern was enough to justify successor liability, notwithstanding that
the foreclosure sale was widely advertised and the transferee's cash bid
131. See id. Section 9-504 (pre-revised), as enacted in New Jersey, provided that:
A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the
collateral .... When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges
the security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate
thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though the secured
party fails to comply with the requirements of this Part or of any judicial proceedings.
U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1972). Section 9-504 does not expressly address the rights under successor
liability law of a creditor like Glynwed who was an unsecured creditor of the original debtor against
a transferee from a secured party. Section 9-504 states that a transfer from a secured creditor to a
transferee "discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien
subordinate thereto." Id. § 9-504(c)(4). Glynwed did not assert a security interest or lien in the
assets of the debtor, but rather an unsecured claim against the debtor. The court found this
distinction significant. See Glynwed, 869 F. Supp. at 273-74. The fact that the transferee acquired
the assets via a section 9-504(3) foreclosure sale did not provide an absolute bar to imposition of
successor liability on the transferee for an unsecured claim against the debtor.
132. See Glynwed, 869 F. Supp. at 271. The court rejected this argument, recognizing that "'the
de facto merger doctrine is supported by 'social policy considerations' independent of any particular
cause of action."' Id. (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 311-12 (3d
Cir. 1985)).
133. See Glyniwed, 869 F. Supp. at 275.
134. See id. at 275-76.
135. See id. at 276.
136. See id. at277.
137. See id. It also appeared to be relevant to the court that "Danco/Plastock held itself out to
the world" as the continuation of Plastimatic and Danco. Id.
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exceeded the appraised value of the assets. '38 In other words, evidence of
continuity was sufficient to support successor liability, even though the
insiders did not rig the transfer price to their advantage.'3 9 In fact, the
court denied Glynwed's alternative motion for summary judgment
against Danco/Plastock on fraudulent transfer grounds, finding that
Glynwed had failed to carry its burden of establishing that the
foreclosure sale was commercially unreasonable or in bad faith.
14
0
C. Evaluating the Transferee's Role in a Post-Transfer
Fraud on Creditors
1. The Transferee Who Knows
So far we have considered transfers in which the transferee
participates in a fraud on creditors in the sense that by colluding with the
transferor, it receives at least part of the booty wrested from creditors by
the transfer. A transferee may be a participant in a fraud on creditors
even without proof that the transferee benefited from it. Under
fraudulent transfer law, even if a transferee gives reasonably equivalent
value for the assets, the transfer still may be subject to avoidance if the
transfer was an actual fraud on creditors. 141 In the absence of conclusive
evidence of value inequivalence, under what circumstances should a
transfer be treated as fraudulent and the transferee subject to successor
liability?
138. Contra G.P. Publications, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 683
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding purchaser of assets at secured creditor's foreclosure sale not liable to
transferor's unsecured creditor as a successor absent evidence that it colluded with the transferee in
connection with the sale). Cf Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d
206, 215 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding transfer avoidable when it was part of a scheme accomplished with
the use of a "friendly and collusive lienor"). U.C.C. § 9-615(0 provides for an adjustment of the
deficiency in the debtor's favor following a sale of collateral where the transferee is the secured
party, a person related to the secured party (§ 9-102), or a secondary obligor. The drafters note that
when the sale is to the foreclosing secured party or a related party, the secured party may "lack[] the
incentive to maximize the proceeds of disposition." Id., official cmt. 6. It requires calculation of the
debtor's deficiency in a case where the sale proceeds are "significantly below the range of
proceeds" based on the amount of proceeds that "would have been realized in a disposition
complying with this part to a [non-insider transferee]." Id. § 9-615(f). The section appears to
address collusion that succeeds notwithstanding the procedural safeguard of "commercial
reasonableness." The drafters provide no guidance as to how the hypothetical sale price to a non-
insider should be derived, particularly whether the hypothetical disposition should be a foreclosure
sale or a voluntary, non-forced sale.
139. See Glynwed, 869 F. Supp. at 277-78.
140. See id. at 278.
141. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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Suppose that a debtor transfers its entire business operation to a
transferee for cash. After the transfer, the debtor distributes the cash to
its shareholders and dissolves without paying the claim of its creditor.
The creditor seeks to impose successor liability on the transferee.
Suppose further (as is likely the case in the transfer of all the assets of a
going concern firm) that there is no objective evidence of the assets'
value other than the transfer itself and that the creditor cannot prove that
the transferee paid the debtor less reasonably equivalent value for the
assets.
The transfer of assets did not deplete the wealth of the transferor,
nor did it enrich the transferee. At least the available evidence on
relative value at the time of the transfer is inconclusive.142 It is clear,
however, that a wealth-depleting transfer occurred. The wealth-depleting
transfer was to shareholders, and it occurred after the first transfer to the
transferee.
Imposition of liability on the transferee in a case like this is
appropriate only to the extent that it creates an incentive for transferees
to prevent or insure creditors against a subsequent fraudulent transfer of
assets from the transferor to its shareholders. A transferee has an
opportunity to do so if it knows that the debtor plans a two-stage transfer
fraud, and that a liquidating transfer to it is the first part of the debtor's
plan.
If the transferee knows of the debtor's plans for after the transfer, it
has an opportunity to prevent loss to creditors that creditors lacked. So
informed, the transferee has an opportunity to be a conduit for imposing
creditors' risk of post-transfer loss on the debtor.' As part of its contract
of transfer with the debtor, the transferee could have imposed onto the
debtor (its shareholders really) the cost of bearing the debtor's expected
liability to its creditors, thwarting shareholders' plan of extracting the
liability-free value of assets for themselves. '" By exposing a transferee
142. In many cases involving sale of an ongoing business, post-hoc, hypothetical valuation of
the assets is inconclusive. See discussion supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Green, supra note 3, at 21, 39-40 (arguing that the conduit theory is the only
valid justification for holding transferees derivatively liable as successors); GILSON & BLACK, supra
note 7, at 1532 ("[T]he point of successor liability is not to cause the successor to bear the costs of
the predecessor's defective products, but as a tool to insure that the predecessor bears the cost.");
Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the
Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985).
144. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 1532.
Imposing liability on any future purchaser of the manufacturer's business means that the
manufacturer must take the cost of future products liability claims into account currently
because it will always bear them. If it continues to operate the business, it will bear the
costs directly through products liability litigation; if it sells the business it will bear the
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to liability in these circumstances, we create an efficient incentive for it
to use the information it has to protect creditors against a future loss at a
cost lower than creditors' cost of protecting themselves. 45 In moral
terms, a transferee who knows what shareholders are about to do but
does nothing to stop them is as reprehensible as the deceitful
shareholders.
Of course, just as it is difficult to prove "actual fraud," it is
difficult, but not impossible, to show that a transferee knew of the
shareholder's post-transfer plans. 46 Evidence of continuity of insiders is
key. The fact that the transferee and the transferor shared common
insiders tends to show that they also shared knowledge about the effect
of the first transfer on creditors' risk of loss from a subsequent
distribution from the debtor to its insiders. Indeed, when the evidence on
relative value is inconclusive, the presence of common insiders suggests,
perhaps as powerfully as evidence of value inequivalence, that the
transferee stood to gain something from the transfer.' 47 In such a case,
where the transferee continues the business of the transferor, successor
liability is an appropriate second best sanction for an actually fraudulent
transferee. If, however, the evidence is clear that the transfer was for
reasonably equivalent value, then the presence of common insiders
should not support an inference of fraud. 48
2. The Transferee Who Should Have Known
For creditors, loss is just as painful whether the cause is a wealth-
depleting transfer to a collusive transferee or a post-transfer, wealth-
eliminating fraudulent dividend to shareholders of their debtor. Absent
evidence of value inequivalence, or common insiders sufficient to
support an inference that the transferee actually knew about the debtor's
costs indirectly through a reduction in the price a purchaser will be willing to pay for the
business.
Id.
145. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 143, at 716 ("It is better for the risk to be borne by
successors who can protect themselves by contract than by tort victims who cannot.").
146. In a leveraged buyout transaction, creditors of the acquired corporation can avoid the
transfer of a security interest to the selling shareholders without establishing inequivalent value on
the transfer. The proof required is that the transferees (selling shareholders of the target company)
knew or should have known that the financing arranged to purchase their shares would deplete the
assets of the target company in fraud of its creditors. See, e.g., Lippi v. City Bank, 955 F.2d 599,
612 (9th Cir. 1992); Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1988); Weiboldt Stores, Inc. v.
Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 502 (N.D. III. 1988).
147. See, e.g., Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 (Wash.
1998); Schmoll v. Acands, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D. Or. 1988), aff'd, 977 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.
1992).
148. See GIvnwed discussion supra notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
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plan to defraud its creditors, should a transferee be liable to creditors on
proof that it should have known of such a plan?
Suppose that the transferee and the debtor did not share common
principals and that the transfer of assets occurred under circumstances
that raise no suspicion of collusion. Suppose further that by examining
the debtor's books before the transfer, the transferee might have
discovered that the debtor had creditors who could not quickly and
cheaply foreclose on its post-transfer assets to satisfy their claims, at
least not before shareholders distributed the assets to themselves and
took off to parts unknown. With this information, the transferee is
arguably in a better position than the transferor's creditors to prevent (or
insure against) loss from a subsequent fraudulent transfer.
It should not be enough to justify successor liability that a
transferee should have known of potential claims against the transferor
that may go unsatisfied after the transfer. 4 9 To justify imposition of
liability, the transferee must have had notice at the time of the transfer of
facts that would make it able to affect the risk of loss to the transferor's
creditors.5 Suppose that before the transfer, the debtor's total liability
exceeded the value of its assets (it is insolvent). It transferred its assets
for their fair market value to the transferee, and distributed the cash it
received to its priority creditor.'5 ' The transferor's unsecured creditors
would have received nothing if the transfer had not occurred. So, neither
the transfer nor the post-transfer distribution to priority creditors made
creditors worse off. The critical assumption is that this transfer occurred
under market conditions that preclude collusion between the transferor's
priority creditors and the transferee. If that is true, then the transferee
could have done nothing to prevent or internalize to the debtor the loss
to unsecured creditors, even though the transferee may have known that
the debtor had claims against it that would go unsatisfied after the
transfer.'
5 2
149. The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability wondered whether
evidence that a transferee knew or should have known of the existence of contingent products
claims against the transferor at the time of the transfer should be sufficient to justify imposition of
successor liability. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 12, reporters' notes to cmt. e (suggesting that
the fraud basis for successor liability may apply when the transferee knows or has reason to know
that the transferor's products are defective at the time of the transfer); see also Murphy, supra note
14, at 830, 847-50 (1988) (proposing a "non-bona fide purchaser" exception to the ordinary rule of
transferee non-liability, under which a transferee who knew or should have known of existing or
potential defects in the transferor's products is liable as a successor).
150. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 830.
151. This was likely the case in Glynwed discussed supra notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
152. Murphy asserts that a transferee who knows of defects in its transferor's products, and that
the transferor plans to dissolve and distribute its assets after the transfer, "may be said to be a cause
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The remaining problem is determining when a transferee could
have discovered, at the time of the transfer, information about the
transferor's creditors post-transfer risk of loss about which it could have
done something. To make a judgment about what an arms' length
transferee should have known about the plans of the debtor/transferor,
we must ascertain the scope of its "reasonable" due diligence review of
the debtor at the time of the transfer. The transferee gains nothing from a
review of facts necessary to ascertain creditors' post-transfer risk of loss
other than immunity from successor liability. So, ideally, the scope of a
reasonable review would reflect a balance of the average cost to the
transferee of such review (not insignificant) with the average benefit to
creditors.
Given the seemingly infinite energy of frauds, and the
multitudinous guises of fraud, any ex ante development of a safe harbor
for due diligence is likely to be difficult and immediately obsolete. On
the other hand, a post-hoc approach is perhaps hopelessly afflicted with
hindsight bias."' It is difficult to exclude from an assessment of what a
transferee "should have known" at the time of the transfer information
about what actually happened after the transfer at issue. 1
4
in the plaintiffs inability to recover from the predecessor." Murphy, supra note 14, at 849. This is
an overstatement. A transfer "causes" loss to creditors only if the transfer increases their expected
loss. This occurs only if shareholders or priority creditors use the transfer to divert assets to
themselves that would otherwise be available to satisfy creditors' claims. Whether as a matter of
policy, legal rules should afford secured creditors with priority claims in the debtor's assets over
involuntary (and unsecured) creditors like products liability claimants is the subject of debate. See
supra note 37.
153. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). For an example of the hindsight bias problem in an
analogous setting, consider the "innocent landowner" defense to liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(a)
(1994). A purchaser can escape liability if it can show that it did not know and had no reason to
know of the contamination at the time it acquired the property. The purchaser must show it used
"appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial and customary practice." Id. at § 9601(35)(B). The court must examine "any
specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable
information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination
at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection." Id. A
commentator noted that in practice this defense has been unsuccessful because courts find that if the
purchaser did not discover contamination existing at the time of the transfer, it did not conduct an
appropriate inquiry. See Larry Schnapf, Cost-Effective Environmental Due Diligence in Corporate
Mergers andAcquisitions, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 80, 81 (2000).
154. As one commentator stated,
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in
foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but
also to view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People
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Fraudulent transfer law addresses the problem of ascertaining what
the transferee should have known about the effect of the transfer on risk
of loss to creditors indirectly through an assessment of the financial
condition of the transferor at the time of the transfer.'5 ' Recall that to
show that a transfer is constructively fraudulent, the creditor must show
that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, or was rendered
insolvent thereby. 56 Or, he must show that the debtor was engaged in
business with "unreasonably small capital"'' s or "intended to incur debts
that would be beyond his ability to pay."'
58
The assessment of the debtor's financial condition is problematic in
some cases given the broad definitions of "claim" under bankruptcy
law5 9 and under the UFTA.' 6° A court may determine that a person had a
bankruptcy "claim" against a product manufacturer at a given moment in
time (e.g., the filing of the manufacturer's bankruptcy case) even if at
that time, the probability that he would be injured and the magnitude of
loss if he were injured was uncertain.' 6' His products liability claim
exists for purposes of bankruptcy administration, although it will not
exist in a cognitive sense until later, if at all.'62 It is not clear whether
such a "claim" should count for purposes of the retrospective assessment
of the debtor's financial condition that fraudulent transfer law requires.
The drafters of fraudulent transfer law may not have contemplated
the case of the contingent future claimant or the impact of his claim on
the "solvency" of the transferor as of the time.of the transfer. Close
believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than actually
was the case.
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.
1982).
155. See Reilly, supra note 36, at 1225.
156. See UFCA, § 4, 7A pt. 11 U.L.A. 2 (1999); UFTA § 5, 7A pt. II U.L.A. 266 (1984)
(available only to present creditors), II U.S.C. § 548(a)(I )(B)(ii)(I).
157. UFCA § 5; UFFA § 4(a)(2)(i); II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
158. UFCA § 5; UFTA § 4(a)(2)(ii); II U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(ii)(ll1).
159. See II U.S.C. § 10 1(5) (1994). See generally Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims
Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 435
(1999) (discussing the importance of resolving contingent claims issues in bankruptcy and other
contexts).
160. See UF[A § 1(3).
161. See, e.g., Tung, supra note 159, at 438; In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (3d
Cir. 1985) (holding that "future claimants" were "parties in interest" under the Bankruptcy Code);
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
162. See, e.g., Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1984) (transferee
acquired asbestos line in 1962); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc. 615 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1980) (transferee
acquired manufacturer of X-ray contrast dye in 1963 revealed decades later to be carcinogenic).
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reading of the statutes does not yield a satisfactory answer. The UFCA is
the most explicit. Section 2 states that a person is insolvent "when the
present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be
required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they
become absolute and matured.' ' 63 Courts have interpreted "probable
liability on existing claims" broadly in favor of creditors.'64 But, it is not
clear that courts would consider a claim based on injury yet to occur that
nobody anticipates at the time of the transfer "probable liability on his
existing debts" under the UFCA.
65
Under UFTA, "a debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts
is greater than all of the debtor's assets at fair valuation."'' 66 "'Debt"'
means "liability on a claim."'' 67 "'Claim"' includes rights that are
contingent and unliquidated at the time of assessment, i.e., future
claims.16 In apparent conflict with the broad definition of "claim," the
UFTA sets different tests for transfer avoidance for creditors whose
claims "arose before the transfer was made" and those whose claims
"arose" later. 69 Under section 5, the first group of creditors can avoid a
transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value on proof that the
transferor was insolvent or became insolvent because of the transfer. 7° A
creditor whose claim did not "arise" until after the transfer, however,
may not use section 5.7' He may still avoid such a transfer, but only
upon proof that the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent
value, and the debtor
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction
for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small
in relation to the business or transaction; or (ii) intended to incur, or
163. UFCA § 2.
164. See, e.g., Cont'l Bank v. Marcus, 363 A.2d 1318, 1320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); Baker v.
Geist, 321 A.2d 634, 636 (Pa. 1974) (involving an unliquidated personal injury claim for injury
occurring pre-transfer held probable liability); Tri-Cont'l Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F.
Supp. 495, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that "existing debts" includes pending claims "however
farfetched") (citation omitted); United States v. St. Mary, 334 F. Supp. 799, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(stating that unassessed tax is a liability for purposes of assessing transferor's insolvency).
165. See UFCA § 2.
166. UFTA § 2(a), 7A pt. II U.L.A. 266 (1984).
167. UFTA § 1(5).
168. See UFTA § 1(3) ("'Claim' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."); see also II U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994) (definition of
"claim").
169. The UFTA is silent on when a claim "arises" for this purpose.
170. See UFTA § 5.
171. See id.
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believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she] would
incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.1
The second of the two alternative grounds is clearly subjective and
would not apply if the creditors' late arising claim was unknowable as of
the time of the transfer.' 73 It is not clear whether the reasonableness of
the debtor's post-transfer capital should be assessed in light of what the
debtor or the transferee or either of them should have known at the time
of the distribution, or by what they came to know with the passage of
time post-transfer.
The bankruptcy definition of "claim" is inconsistent with the
concept of liability reflected in standard financial accounting principles.
These principles differentiate among categories of contingent liability,
recognizing "probable," "reasonably possible" and "remote" liability.'
74
Remote liability is defined as claims contingent on the occurrence of
events the probability of which is "slight.'' 75 Liability is not accounted
for as a charge to income unless it is "probable.'
'176
Outside of the context of successor liability, some courts permit
information about events that occurred after the transfer to inform the
question of what the parties could reasonably have foreseen at the time
172. Id. § 4(2)(i), (ii).
173. See id.
174. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES,
.STATEMENT NO. 5, § 3 (1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum5.shtml
[hereinafter FASB].
175. See id.
176. See FASB, supra note 174, § 8(a). A financial statement must disclose the contingency
"when there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss may have occurred." Id. § 10.
Disclosure is not required of a loss contingency involving an unasserted claim or
assessment when there has been no manifestation by a potential claimant of an
awareness of a possible claim or assessment unless it is considered probable that a claim
will be asserted and there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome will be
unfavorable.
Id. The Securities and Exchange Commission considers FASB No. '5 as having "substantial
authoritative support." Accounting Series Releases and Staff Accounting Bulletins as of June 1,
1981, 38 Fed. Reg. 1260 (Dec. 20, 1973). See, e.g., Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 24
(Ist Cir. 1992); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (considering FASB No. 5 in
SEC suit alleging that company failed to disclose contingent liability); see also MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 14.06 official cmt. (2002) ("[A] claim that is contingent or has not yet matured or in certain
cases has matured but has not been asserted is not a 'known' claim."). Cf EDWARD P. WELCH &
ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTALS
§ 281(b) (1997) (stating that to assure directors immunity from liability to creditors, a dissolving
corporation, with court approval, can set aside assets to pay claims that "have not arisen, but that,
based on facts known to the corporation ... are likely to arise ... within 10 years after the date of
dissolution").
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of the transfer.7 7 A few courts permit introduction of evidence of post-
valuation events liberally as evidence of value at the time of valuation
without regard to whether the parties could have foreseen those events.1
When the issue is the value of property for tax purposes, the Internal
Revenue Service notes that the value of property as of a particular time
is to be based on the facts "available at the time of the appraisal" and not
those which are revealed later.'79 Leading credentialing bodies in
business valuation state the same rule for appraisal of property.'80 At
least one standard for appraisers permits consideration of facts that
become known only post-valuation "as a confirmation of trends that
would reasonably be considered by a buyer or seller as of that date."' 8 '
The rationale for considering post-valuation facts in a post-hoc
assessment of value is persuasive. Certain facts that come to light after
the appraisal date illuminate the question of what the parties to a
hypothetical transfer could have known at the time of the valuation.'82
177. See, e.g., Ridgely v. United States, 20 A.F.T.R. 2d 5946, 5954 (1967) (holding that
purchase of real property from estate by General Foods for use as a Jell-O manufacturing plant after
the valuation could not reasonably have been foreseen and was not considered); Estate of Gilford v.
Comm'r, 88 T.C. 38, 52 (1987) (stating that post-valuation events can be considered only for the
"'limited purpose' of establishing what the willing buyer and seller's expectations were on the
valuation date and whether these expectations were 'reasonable and intelligent') (citing Estate of
Jephson v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 999 (1983)).
178. See, e.g., Estate of Jung v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 412, 430-31 (1993) (noting that a sale of
comparable property occurring two years after the date of valuation was not foreseeable but
nonetheless was relevant on the question of value); Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-149 (stating that sale of stock relevant on valuation of stock four years earlier).
179. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 I.R.B. 237, 238 ("Valuation of securities is, in essence,
a prophesy as to the future and must be based on facts available at the required date of appraisal.");
see also Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (Holmes, J.) ("Like all values,
as the word is used by the law, it depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future;
and the value is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out
true.").
180. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS, BUSINESS VALUATION STANDARDS, BVS-I
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPING A BUSINESS VALUATION 1I(C)(1)(c)(2), at 5, available
at http://www.bvappraisers.org/standards/bvstandards.pdf (stating that an appraisal "considers all
the relevant information as of the appraisal date available to the appraiser at the time of the
performance of the valuation."); INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS APPRAISERS, BUSINESS
APPRAISAL STANDARDS § 1.20, available at http://www.instbusapp.org/catalog.asp?CatlD=l &SKU
=P-31 I B#P-31 I B (explaining that an appraisal shall be based on "what a reasonably informed
person would have knowledge of as of a certain date .... Information unavailable or unknown on
the date of valuation nust not influence the appraiser or contributed to the concluding opinion of
value.").
181. UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE, Statement on Appraisal
Standards No. 3, 59 (Appraisal Standards Bd. of the Appraisal Found. 1994).
182. See id. ("The appraiser should determine a logical cut-off since, at some point distant
from the effective date, the subsequent data will not reflect the relevant market. This is a difficult
determination to make."). The same appraisal standards in another section prohibit the use of
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The problem with this logic is defining the boundary between late
arising information that should be considered as evidence of what the
parties should have known, and that which should not. If all information
about post-valuation date events are relevant to assess value without any
limitation as to foreseeability as of the valuation, theoretically all
valuations become tentative, and eternally subject to reassessment with
the passage of time.
The real problem with the scope of successor liability has nothing
to do with a mystical assessment of the presence and sufficiency of
"continuity." Indeed, the real problem is the same as that which
underlies the scope of fraudulent transfer law itself-determining the
boundary of the idea of "fraud." This article argues that the outer
boundary of a transferee's liability to its transferor's creditors, whether
under fraudulent transfer law or successor liability doctrine, ought to be
limited based on what the transferee could have known at the time of the
transfer. The critical question is whether at the time of the transfer, the
transferee had notice of facts necessary to assess the magnitude and
probability of creditors claims and an opportunity to prevent or insure
against loss to creditors.'83 Within this question is buried another. What
kind of evidence supports an inference of such notice?
V. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR THE UNKNOWABLE CLAIM
All asset transferees are always on notice that claims against their
transferor might exist at the time of the transfer. It makes no sense to
treat this kind of notice as sufficient to justify successor liability. If a
claim against the debtor/transferor was, in accounting terms, "remote" at
the time of the transfer, then the transferee could not have had the
information necessary to protect creditors or future claimants by action
at the time of the transfer. For a transferee to be an effective weapon
against fraud, it must be able to quantify to some extent the expected
information available only after the valuation date. See UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
APPRAISAL PRACTICE, Statement on Appraisal Standards No. I, 53 (Appraisal Standards Bd. of the
Appraisal Found. 1994) (stating that review appraisers may have additional information that was not
available to the original appraiser and that it is "appropriate for the review appraiser to use this
information in estimating value" but that a review appraisal that "does not include all of the
requirements contained in Standards Rule 3-2 [including the nature, extent, and detail of the review
processi is in violation of the USPAP, since departure from this rule is not permitted.").
183. Courts do not always see the distinction between notice that a risk exists and of its
expected value. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th
Cir. 1973).
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value of creditors' claims so it can take them into account in striking its
bargain with the transferor. 
4
The most vulnerable type of creditor is the holder of a "contingent
unknown claim" such as one who holds a claim for injury to arise in the
future from a product defect. 85 In some cases, this potential liability is
sufficiently certain and large that transactional planners can take it into
account and plot to snatch assets from creditors before the claims arise.
8 6
The debtor's shareholders can sell the corporate assets free of the future
and as yet contingent claims of creditors. By the transfer, they realize the
liability-free value of the assets by cutting any effective recovery for
those late-arising claimants."7
Yet, if the expected liability is "remote," so that planners could not
have formed a transfer strategy to escape it, a transfer that leaves
creditors with loss cannot be a "fraud" on creditors. True, the post-
transfer dissolution of the debtor may in fact enrich shareholders at
creditors' expense, but neither the shareholders nor the transferee could
have acted to prevent creditors' loss at the time of the transfer.
Professor Michael Green has argued persuasively that the problem
presented by contingent future claims is best addressed by legislation.' 8
184. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text; see also Green, supra note 3, at 39-40
(proposing that the purpose of imposing successor products liability on a transferee is to create an
incentive for it to act as a "conduit" for transferor's creditors' loss.); Roe, supra note 67, at 565;
Cupp, supra note 3, at 860-63. Cupp advocates imposition of successor liability on transferees who
continue the business of the transferor without regard to the transferee's role in a fraud. See id. at
867. He asserts that insurance for products liability claimants' expected loss is "readily available
and relatively inexpensive" yet he does not make the critical distinction between those claims for
which the magnitude and probability of loss are estimable for purpose of pricing insurance, and
unknowable claims, which are by definition uninsurable risks. See id. at 870.
185. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 1505.
186. See id.
187. See id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 143, at 714-716; Robert D. Cooter, Defective
Warnings, Remote Causes, and Bankruptcy: Comment on Schwartz, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 737, 749
(1985).
188. See Green, supra note 3, at 48-58. Green notes that the Model Business Corporation Act
was revised in 1984 to address the problem of contingent future claims in corporate dissolution. He
concludes that the revision, which imposes a five-year limitation post-dissolution on assertion of
such claims "does little to alleviate the situation." Id. at 49. Tung argues persuasively that the
transferor's bankruptcy case provides a forum for considering and safeguarding the rights of future
claimants. See generally Tung, supra note 159. See also Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle
for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000)
(discussing how bankruptcy system might be improved to respond more effectively to mass tort
cases); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Commentary, A Response to Professor Resnick: Will this Vehicle Pass
Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (arguing that Resnick overstates the utility of
bankruptcy as a response to mass tort); Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass
Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367 (1994) (proposing use of capital market to value future claims
for administration in bankruptcy cases).
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He proposes a model law that would require manufacturers to make
"adequate provision" for potential liability as a pre-condition to
dissolution and distribution of assets to shareholders.'89 Green's
legislative solution is intriguing. But as he recognizes, it does not solve
the problem of potential loss externalization to holders of truly
unknowable contingent future claims."
The problem with a legislative solution is the same as the problem
with "fraud" generally as a limiting principle for transferee liability.
Whether a transferor made "adequate provision" for future contingent
claims must turn on a post-hoc assessment of what it knew or should
have known about the magnitude and probability of such claims at the
time of the transfer. '9' A satisfactory legislative solution would involve
more than corporate law requiring insiders to make "adequate provision"
for expected future claims. It would require the creation of a source of
compensation for holders of unknown, unknowable future claims
perhaps in the form of a corporate tax on product manufacturers, or a
general tax on all of us.
Absent such a broad, and perhaps politically infeasible legislative
solution, claimants have asked courts for equitable relief under the
successor liability doctrine. 92 Although most courts have declined to
expand successor liability beyond the bounds of fraud as developed
here,' 93 some courts have done so ostensibly to provide a source of
compensation for claimants who cannot establish fraud.' 94 These courts
justify imposition of successor liability under theories known as
"continuity of enterprise" or "product line."' 95
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 196 provides an example of the
"continuity of enterprise" approach.' 97 The majority held that policies
189. See Green, supra note 3, at 50-51 ("[N]o corporation that has engaged in manufacturing
products that it sells or leases may dissolve or distribute its assets to its shareholders in connection
with its dissolution until the corporation has made adequate provision for post-dissolution products
liability claims."). The legislation suggests alternative ways to make "adequate provision."
190. Seeid. at58.
191. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
192. See Cupp, supra note 3, at 846.
193. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 12 cmt. b. One commentator disputes the assertion.
See Cupp, supra note 3, at 856. He argues that what he terms the "less restrictive" approach to
successor liability is not a stagnant minority view. See id. at 852-56. He observes that the thirteen
states that have adopted either the product line or the substantial continuity tests contain about forty-
three percent of the national population. See id. at 856.
194. See generally Cupp, supra note 3, at 852-58 (asserting that the number of jurisdictions
that have expanded successor liability is greater than previous estimates).
195. See, e.g., id. at 848-49.
196. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
197. See Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136, 143-44 (E.D. Mich. 1979); see also
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underlying products liability law justified imposition of successor
liability, entirely without evidence of fraud.'98 In Turner, an injured
person sued the transferee for an injury he sustained from an allegedly
defective machine the transferor had manufactured years before the
transfer.9 None of the transferor's shareholders maintained an interest
in the transferee so the plaintiff could not establish the continuity of
shareholders between the transferor and the transferee requisite for a
finding of defacto merger.2"
The court identified the issue before it as one of products liability.20'O
It criticized the "traditional corporate law approach" to successor
liability as turning on a perfunctory evaluation of "whether the
transaction is labeled a merger, a de facto merger, or a purchase of assets
for cash."2 °2 Whether the transfer was for stock or cash mattered not a bit
to the injured plaintiff."3 Continuity of shareholders was but "one factor
to use to determine whether there exists a sufficient nexus between the
successor and predecessor corporations to establish successor
liability."2' 4 The court did not consider whether either of the parties
could have known at the time of the transfer of the probability or
Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979). See generally OWEN ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 19:6, at 390-93. For products liability cases adopting the "continuity of enterprise"
approach, see id. at 391 n.25.
198. See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877-78. The dissent noted that the purpose of successor
liability is to rectify fraud on the transferor's creditors. See id. at 886-87 (Coleman, J., dissenting in
which Fitzgerald, J. concurred). The indicia of fraud are "inadequate consideration paid to the
transferor, and/or lack of good faith." Id. at 887. There was "no evidence of inadequate
consideration" and "only the vaguest charges of fraud through lack of good faith in structuring the
particular acquisition method used." Id. It identified the problem for creditors as one of timing, not
fraud. See id.
199. See id. at 875. Between the manufacture and sale of the machine and the injury, the
manufacturer sold its assets for cash. See id.
200. See id. at 879; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
201. See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877. "This is a products liability case first and foremost." Id.
The court rejected the ordinary rule of transferee non-liability subject to its three exceptions,
because it was "developed not in response to products liability problems, but largely in the areas of
creditors' protection." Id. at 878.
202. Id. at 879. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977); Shannon v.
Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974). See the discussion of the
significance of continuity of shareholders supra notes 109-40 and accompanying text.
203. See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878. "To the injured person the problem of recovery is
substantially the same, no matter what corporate process led to transfer of the first corporation
and/or its assets." Id.
204. Id. at 880. The transferee retained the transferor's key personnel, general business
operations, and corporate name, which the court found to be "sufficient nexus" to justify successor
liability. See id. at 880, 883-84.
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magnitude of the plaintiff's claim for injury from the transferor's
previously manufactured product.
20
1
Earlier, in Ray v. Alad Corp.,2 6 the California Supreme Court
recognized the "product line" basis for successor liability.27 To establish
a transferee as a "mere continuation" of the transferor, California law
required proof that the transferee paid less than fair value for the assets,
and that the debtor's insiders continued their interest in the transferee.
The plaintiff had not established either fact.209 The court held for the
plaintiff nonetheless. 0 "[A] party which acquires a manufacturing
business and continues the output of its line of products ... assumes
strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line previously
manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was
acquired." 2'
Since these cases were decided, some courts have confined the
availability of fraud-free successor liability to cases involving product
liability claims.2 But in the opposite direction, a few courts have
imposed successor liability in products liability cases even when the
transferee did not continue to manufacture the relevant product line.23
When liability for environmental injury under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA")2 4 is at issue, some federal courts have imposed successor
205. The transferee expressly agreed to assume the transferor's liabilities "'existing on the
Closing Date,"' with the exception of certain obligations to shareholders, and expenses relating to
the sale of assets. Id. at 875 n.l (quoting sales agreement between transferee and transferor). The
plaintiff argued that the transferee expressly assumed liability for its products claim, presumably
because it was "'existing on the Closing Date' although contingent. Id. at 876-77. The transferee
argued that it assumed only known liability of the transferor as of the Closing Date, and not a
products liability claim arising from injury that occurred four years after the closing. See id. at 877.
The court expressly did not resolve this issue because it decided the case "on the basis of tort
liability." Id. at 876-77.
206. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
207. See id. at 11; see also, e.g., Bogart v. Phase 11 Pasta Machs., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 547, 550
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (transferee held liable for transferor's products liability under "product line" test);
Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 249-50 (N.M. 1997) (same). For cases adopting the "product
line" approach, see OWEN ET AL., supra note 3,. § 19:6, at 391 n.30.
208. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 7.
209. See id. at 8. Like the Michigan court in Tumer, the court did not appear to understand the
significance of these requirements as proof of the transferee's role in a fraud on the transferor's
creditors. It described them as "making succession to the liabilities of an acquired going business
depend[] on the form and circumstances of the acquisition." Id.
210. Seeid. at ll.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1985).
213. See, e.g., Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);
Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp., 611 A.2d 153, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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liability based on a finding of "substantial continuity" between a
corporate transferor and transferee.25 Although courts have recognized
that perfect continuity is not required for successor liability, it is by no
means clear that evidence of collusion or fraud is not required. For
example, in United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co.,2 6 the court noted
that under the "substantial continuity test" whether the transferor's
shareholders continued their interest in the transferee was not critical.
2
1
7
It held that other indicia of continuity were equally important-for
example, retention of the same name, employees, supervisors,
production facilities; production of the same product; continuity of
assets and general business operations; and whether the transferee holds
itself out as a continuation of the transferor's business."' The court did
not impose successor liability because it found that the transferee lacked
notice of potential liability and an opportunity to collude with the
transferor.2 9
215. See, e.g., Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 391, 405 (M.D. Pa.
1998) (holding that a broader "substantial continuity" approach furthers CERCLA's remedial
purpose); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1244-47 (6th Cir. 1991) (same);
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988) (same). But
see John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 408 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to adopt
"substantial continuity" test); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 132
F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). Whether federal common law governs successor
liability under CERCLA is in doubt after United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998),
where the Court noted that circuit courts disagree on this matter, but declined to reach the issue. For
further discussion of the "substantial continuity" approach in the context of CERCLA, see generally
Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying Proposal for
Imposing CERCLA Liability on Asset Purchasers, 4 ENVT'L. LAw. 435 (1998) and Michael D.
Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Liability and an Alternative
Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897 (1993). When the liability at issue is to the transferor's pension
fund, under federal common law, a transferee incurs successor liability if it had notice of the fund's
claim against the transferor and there is "substantial continuity" between the transferor's business
operations and those of the transferee. See, e.g., Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic
Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 1327 (7th Cir. 1990).
216. 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992).
217. Seeid.at488&n.10.
218. See id. The court did indicate that the transferee's good faith may not be a complete
defense to successor liability. "Even in cases of good faith, a bona-fide successor reaps the
economic benefits of its predecessor's use of hazardous disposal methods, and, as the recipient of
the benefits, is also responsible for the costs of those benefits." Id. at 487.
219. See id. at 489-90. Cf Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 132 F.3d at 1301-02 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting that where the broader "substantial continuity" test has been applied "there has almost
always been some fraudulent intent and collusion present, in which case the purchaser would have
likely already been liable under another traditional exception-the fraudulently-entered transaction
exception"); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1992)
(applying the "substantial continuity" test when "the record ... [left] the unmistakable impression
that the transfer ... was part of an effort to continue the business in all material respects yet avoid
the environmental liability arising from" transferor's business practices).
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Courts who have imposed successor liability under one of the
continuity-based theories described above have not satisfactorily
explained why, in a particular case, the interest of the plaintiff creditor
should prevail over that of the transferee.2 2 0 Like the proponents of a
fraud-free theory of fraudulent transfer law,22' courts and commentators
would rest successor liability on ad hoc assessments of fairness.22
The failure is understandable. If the transferee's role in a fraud on
the transferor's creditors is not relevant to whether the transferee is to be
liable, then transferee liability can be bound only by vague, untestable
pronouncements of "sufficient" continuity, which in turn reveals the
"fair" result in a given case.
Professor Richard Cupp, Jr. has recently conceded that the most
persuasive justification for continuity-based successor liability is to
"channel[] responsibility back to the [transferor]., 223 He asserts that
while product consumers have little or no ability to plan for loss
following dissolution of their debtor, a transferee, who in some respects
continues the business of the debtor, "is in as good or better a position as
the [debtor] to determine whether products made by [the debtor] are
220. See generally Cupp, supra note 3, at 858-67 (describing variety of rationales offered for
continuity-based approaches to successor liability); Green, supra note 3, at 28-40 (same). See also,
e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (lst Cir. 1974) (finding that because transferee
"holds itself out" to the public as the transferor's successor, thereby "exploiting all of the
accumulated good will" of transferor, it should be estopped from denying the transferor's liability);
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977) (holding that where transferee destroys plaintiffs
remedies against transferor, is capable of spreading risks, and enjoys use of the "goodwill" of the
transferor, it should also be liable for the transferor's debts); Ramirez v. Armsted Indus. Inc., 431
A.2d 811, 820 (N.J. 1981) (holding that transferee should be liable in part because it played a part in
the destruction of the creditor's remedies).
221. Some commentators believe that the constructive fraud grounds for fraudulent transfer
avoidance similarly ought to be understood as a kind of "strict liability designed to redress creditor
injury." See supra notes 103-40 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 59, at 64
(arguing that fraudulent transfer law protects creditors from "significant[] harm" unless that harm is
not "unjust"); Kennedy, supra note 50, at 534-35 (similar); TABB, supra note 43, at 424 (noting that
the focus of fraudulent transfer law is on the creditors). Tabb observes that courts have found
constructive fraud without a hint or even possibility of debtor misbehavior. See id. at 423.
222. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 3, at 869-70.
The continuity of enterprise and product line approaches are merely points further down
the spectrum of relationship between the old corporation and the new. When the
successor's enterprise is sufficiently similar to the predecessor's for a court to find a
continuity of enterprise, the court is in effect saying that the successor is similar enough
that justice demands holding it responsible. Likewise, continuing to sell a predecessor's
product line creates a powerful nexus of identity between the old corporation and the
new that may make the imposition of successor liability seem fair .... Any burden on
corporations is appropriate if on balance it is good for society.
Id. (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 861.
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defective and will lead to liability." '224 He observes that the "burden of
successor liability [on such a transferee] is mitigated by the existence of
readily available and relatively inexpensive insurance."2
Cupp's model of the transferee as the least cost insurer of creditors'
loss misses an important limitation on the transferee's capacity to
channel or internalize creditors' risk of loss to the debtor. If a transferee
could have purchased "relatively inexpensive insurance" against
creditors' future loss, it must also be true that creditors' future claims
were insurable risks at the time of the transfer. When the debtor or the
transferee could have purchased insurance coverage for risk of loss to
creditors at the time of a transfer, it is entirely reasonable to infer that a
transferee should have known that the transferor's creditors faced a high
risk of post-transfer fraud loss. By insisting that the debtor provide
insurance for such claims, or by providing such insurance itself at the
debtor's expense, the transferee effectively internalizes the risk of loss to
the debtor's shareholders.226
But, that is the easy case. Cupp does not consider the hard case
where neither the transferor nor transferee could have known either the
magnitude or the probability of loss from future claims against the
transferor.227 Insurance coverage for such a risk would by definition not
be available at all. And the transferee, regardless of the similarity of its
business operations, could have done nothing to protect creditors from
loss. Imposition of successor liability on the transferee in such a case
will not create an incentive to internalize creditors' loss onto the
transferor's shareholders. 22' Nor will it reduce the likelihood that
creditors will bear externalized loss. It will only shift wealth from one
group of investors to another.229
A continuity-based theory of successor liability that eliminates the
role of fraud will probably not result in too little transferee liability.
224. Id. at 867-68. But see Green, supra note 3, at 34 (observing that transfers at issue in
several high profile products liability cases occurred before the risks of the particular product were
understood).
225. Cupp, supra note 3, at 870. Cupp does not explain how he determines when insurance
coverage is "relatively inexpensive."
226. See id. at 862-63.
227. See id. at 867-73.
228. Alan Schwartz argued that for purposes of its duty to warn consumers, a firm should be
treated as ignorant of a risk of a product defect when the product turns out to be more dangerous
than the firm could have discovered had it conducted a cost-justified research program to ascertain
the risk. See Schwartz, supra note 143, at 694.
229. Cf. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.)
("Shifting these losses from one group of investors to another does not diminish their amplitude,
any more than rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic prevents its sinking.").
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Fraudulent transfer law will pick up the slack. As discussed earlier, a
fraudulent transferee who does not "sufficiently continue" the business
or other attributes of the transferor will nonetheless be vulnerable to
transfer avoidance under fraudulent transfer law. 20 And, as we have
seen, when the transferee is "different" than the transferor, transfer
avoidance is a more efficient remedy than imposition of successor
liability. 3 ' The real danger of judicial rhetoric that elevates continuity as
a fraud-free justification for successor liability is the risk of
unpredictable, and potentially huge, transferee liability.
Whatever might be said for broad successor liability on wealth
distributive grounds, such policy cannot seriously be justified by
evidence of continuity, or effectively concealed behind pronouncements
of "fairness." Stripped bare of metaphors, a court must balance the rights
of creditors with those of a transferee. Without any reason to suspect the
bona fides of the transferee in a particular case, there simply is no reason
to impose creditors' loss on it, short of imposing creditors' loss on all
transferees simply because they are transferees. Observations of
continuity cannot define the boundaries of successor liability without a
clear understanding of what evidence of continuity tends to show.
Bulk transfer legislation illustrates the intrinsic tautology. A
commentator writing in 1928 noted that during the last decade of the
nineteenth century, trade creditors were losing their shirts to debtors who
liquidated their stock then headed for the hills with the cash without
paying creditors.232 Recourse against the absconding debtor was no
comfort to creditors, because the debtor was difficult to locate or
insolvent. Although courts were willing to find that buyers lacked good
faith on circumstantial evidence of collusion,233 fraudulent transfer law
afforded no relief against a good faith purchaser who acquired the assets
230. See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
231. See id.
232. See Thomas Clifford Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. PA.
L. REV. 72, 76 & n.18 (1928). Billig observed that the economic panic of 1893 "proved disastrous
to those retailers who had stocked up with goods at pre-panic prices, especially in the agricultural
communities, and the temptation was great to unload for even a small percentage of the original cost
of the merchandise." Id. at 77. An advocate for creditors saw these "panic" sales in a malevolent
light and described them as "[a] favorite indoor sport ... [which the debtor could play] without fear
of punishment whenever the debtor felt the urge of the deceitful method." 29 CREDIT MONTHLY 11,
12 (1927) (J. Harry Tregoe, Executive Manager, National Association of Credit Men) as quoted in
Billig, supra, at 75.
233. Under pre-bulk transfer legislation fraudulent transfer analysis, the transferee's complicity
could rest on facts of which he should have been aware. See, e.g., Coder v. McPherson, 152 F. 951,
953-54 (8th Cir. 1907); In re Pease, 129 F. 446, 448 (E.D. Mich. 1902); Hennequin v. Naylor, 24
N.Y. 139, 141 (1861); O'Leary v. Duvall, 39 P. 163, 165 (Wash. 1895).
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for value, and without notice of the transferor's fraudulent intentions.234
From creditors' perspective, the requirement that they prove, even
indirectly, the transferee's complicity in the debtor's fraud was an
intolerable obstacle to the just result-recovery for them .
The result of creditors' lobbying was widespread enactment of bulk
transfer legislation.2 36 These laws rendered certain transfers in bulk void
or voidable unless the transferor and transferee complied with
prerequisites intended to give the transferor's creditors information in
advance of the proposed transfer.13' The laws replaced the question of the
transferee's role in a fraud with that of the scope of the legislation.238 For
example, one variety of bulk sales laws applied to transfers in bulk of
"merchandise" other than in the ordinary course of business.239 In one
jurisdiction, the term "merchandise" included horses and carriages sold
by one whose business was trading horses.240 In another, the same term
did not include assets comprising a livery stable.24 ' Courts attempting to
discern the legislative meaning of "merchandise" were left without
guidance, other than a feeling that the legislature intended to curb
transfers that were "unfair" to creditors. Under successor liability
doctrine, courts endeavor to find the requisite level of continuity against
the same blank slate.
234. See Billig, supra note 232, at 77-80; see, e.g., Carter v. Richardson, 60 S.W. 397, 399
(1901); see also U.C.C. Art. 6 prefatory note (1999). The drafters noted that the law of fraudulent
conveyances ameliorated the creditors' plight but "to a limited extent." Id. "[Flraudulent
conveyance law provided no remedy against persons who bought in good faith, without reason to
know of the seller's intention to pocket the proceeds and disappear, and for adequate value." Id.
235. See Billig, supra note 232, at 78-79.
236. Seeid. at81.
237. See ALCES, supra note 19, 4.02. The laws generally provided creditors with an
avoidance action against a transferee who acquired merchandise or stock in trade without
compliance with the statutory requisites, and without specific proof of the transferee's participation
in a fraud on creditors. See Frank W. Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, 1954 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 2 ("[Tihe statutes provide either that a sale of the type proscribed may be avoided by
existing creditors of the seller if the statute is not complied with, or that a presumption of fraud is
raised by non-compliance."). In Wright v. Hart, 35 N.E. 404 (N.Y. 1905), the New York Court of
Appeals found the New York bulk sales law unconstitutional, in part because it did not distinguish
fraudulent from non-fraudulent transfers. See id. at 407. Eleven years later, the same court reversed
itself and found an identical law constitutional in part because "[t]he unanimous, or all but
unanimous, voice of the judges of the land, in federal and state courts alike, has upheld the
constitutionality of these laws." Klein v. Maravelas, 114 N.E. 809, 810 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.).
238. See Miller, supra note 237, at 14.
239. See id. at 9-15; see also, e.g., Patmos v. Grand Rapids Dairy Co., 220 N.W. 724, 725
(Mich. 1928) (involving Michigan bulk sales law).
240. See Tupper v. Barrett, 124 N.E. 427, 428 (Mass. 1919).
241. See Everett Produce Co. v. Smith Bros., 82 P. 905,906-07 (Wash. 1905).
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The drafters of the Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability242
missed an important opportunity to clarify the role of fraud in successor
liability cases. The Restatement restates the often-cited list of bases for
241imposition of successor liability. In the commentary, the drafters assert
that successor liability is appropriate if the transferee "is implicated in
the transfer of assets in a way that, without such liability, would unfairly
deprive future products liability plaintiffs of the remedies that would
otherwise have been available against the predecessor."'2" The drafters
describe the traditional de facto merger and mere continuation bases for
successor liability as those in which the transferee "can be said to have
sold or distributed the defective products because [it] constitutes the
same juridical entity as the predecessor, perhaps in a somewhat different
form. 2 4 5
This explanation of successor products liability dislocates the
transferee's role in a fraud from the transferee's appearance as "the same
juridical entity" as the transferor.246 The Restatement fails to explain how
a court should ascertain whether the transferee "constitutes the same
juridical entity" as the transferor so as to make the transferee's non-
liability "unfair." 47 It does, however, reflect case law which in turn
reflects misunderstanding of the role of fraud in successor liability
248
cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
A transferee should be liable as a successor not because it continues
some attributes of the transferor, but rather because it colluded with the
transferor in fraud of creditors, or at the time of the transfer reasonably
should have known that the debtor/transferor planned to hide assets from
creditors. Evidence of continuity-of shareholders or other insiders,
business operations, or product line-can be probative on the question of
collusion and on that of the transferee's access to information about a
future fraud on creditors. Absent this critical evidence, the fact that a
transferee uses the acquired assets in the same way as the transferor did,
or continues to manufacture a similar product line, does not make the
242. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 12.
243. See id.
244. Id. § 12 cmt. b.
245. Id. § 12 cmt. a.
246. Id.
247. See id. § 12 cmts. f-g.
248. See id.
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transfer sufficiently "unfair" to the transferor's creditors to justify
imposition of their loss on the transferee.
As the law of fraud evolves, frauds become more sophisticated.
That fraud in the transfer of assets may be more subtle than in the past,
does not justify the conclusion that fraud is irrelevant to successor
liability doctrine. The appropriate response to increased sophistication of
frauds is to expand the sophistication of inquiry into what kind of
conduct should be embraced within the meaning of the term "fraud."
This is a formidable challenge. It demands that we update our
understanding of fraud itself to take into account the diverging
incentives of corporate shareholders, managers, creditors, and
transferees. No matter how tempting it may be to sidestep the task,
courts must evaluate what actors could have known at the moment they
took the actions that ultimately affected the transferor's creditors. Courts
have been looking for fraud in this way for at least four centuries. Once
they are clear about what it is, they are highly adept at detecting it.
By bringing the meaning of "fraud" into focus, we confront directly
the conflict between the interests of claimants who have suffered loss
and the rights of transferees who could have done nothing to prevent it.
These challenges are worth confronting, and should not be sublimated in
favor of an empty assessment of "continuity." Although creditors'
claims in a given case may be worthy, we must not lose sight of the
effect of boundless, fraud-free successor liability on asset value
generally, and on the delicate balance of risk and reward among
claimants against an enterprise.
[Vol. 31:745
